3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
327.
In relation to
the “threat” posed
by Iraq, Mr Hoon was advised:
•
“Saddam has
previously attacked his neighbours; he is developing
weapons
of mass
destruction (WMD).”
•
“But he is
not currently threatening his neighbours and his WMD
programme
is less
advanced than, say, Iran’s or Libya’s. There is no proven link
between
Saddam and
AQ [Al Qaida].”
•
“Saddam is
being contained. There is no objective justification for a
pre-emptive
attack on
Iraq now or in the immediate future.”
328.
In relation to
the “geo-political
implications” of military
action, the points included:
“International
community […] poor at handling more than one crisis
simultaneously.
Attack on
Iraq would provoke an additional crisis – increasing the risk that
other
flashpoints
… would be allowed to ignite/spin out of control.”
329.
On US
“War
Plans” and
“UK
involvement” the points
included:
•
“US plans
are bold and imaginative. Superior capabilities should ensure
rapid
defeat of
Iraqi formations.”
•
“But
success is not assured … Iraqis could use CBW.”
•
The
“Possibility of significant numbers of casualties” could not be
excluded.
•
“Significant
UK engagement (ie ground forces) could conceivably allow us
to
influence
US plans and would earn us huge kudos in Washington with
potential
paybacks
elsewhere. Refusal to provide any
support
would … severely damage
relationship.”
•
“In
practice, US plans are more likely to be driven by internal US
factors –
especially
if things start to go wrong.”
•
“UK’s
standing with key Gulf states that are negative … or agnostic …
about
the attack
would suffer: they will see that there is no longer any
discernable
difference
between US and UK policy.”
330.
In relation to
“UK
opinion”, Mr Hoon was
advised:
•
“There is
widespread unease about WMD. UK involvement in a
successful
campaign
could be immensely popular …”
•
“But there
is widespread scepticism about the justification for a
pre-emptive
attack
(Saddam is not seen as posing an imminent threat) and cynicism
about
US
motives.”
•
“Public
support … would be lukewarm and brittle.”
331.
The advice
concluded:
•
“The case
for attacking Iraq now or in the immediate future is deeply
flawed.
The absence
of a legal justification is not in itself a reason for doing
nothing.
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