The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
passed in
1998 following the military action we took in Iraq, US and UK in
1998.
So it was
obviously going to be on the agenda. I was always going to make it
clear
and did
make it clear we would be shoulder to shoulder with America in
dealing with
these
threats after September 11th. So
how we were to deal with that would be an
open
question. That we were going to deal with it I think was pretty
clear from that
63.
Following
the attacks, President Bush determined that the Taliban
regime
in Afghanistan,
which was harbouring Al Qaida, should be the priority for
the
US Administration
in what it called a war on terrorism.
64.
In the
context of a possible Phase 2 of that war, President Bush
also
ordered the
US Defense Department to be ready to deal with Iraq if it acted
against
US interests.
65.
On 15
September the British Embassy Washington reported to London that
the
US now
looked at the world through a new prism: US policy towards Iraq
would harden,
especially
if any evidence emerged which linked Saddam Hussein to the
terrorists.35
The “regime-change
hawks” in Washington were arguing that a coalition put
together
for one
purpose [against international terrorism] could be used to clear up
other problems
in the
region.
66.
President Bush
convened a meeting of his national security team at Camp
David
on 15 September.36
The team
included Vice President Dick Cheney, Mr Colin Powell
(US Secretary
of State), Mr Donald Rumsfeld (US Secretary of
Defense),
Mr George
Tenet (Director of Central Intelligence), Dr Condoleezza Rice (US
National
Security
Advisor) and Mr Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Secretary of
Defense).
67.
The National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, the
9/11
Commission,
reported that:
•
President
Bush had wondered immediately after the attack whether
Saddam
Hussein’s
regime might have had a hand in it; and that he had also
thought
about
Iran.
•
On the
afternoon of 11 September, Secretary Rumsfeld had instructed
General
Myers, the
Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the US
response
should
consider a wide range of options and possibilities; and said that
his
instinct
was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time – not only Usama
Bin
34
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 7.
35
Telegram
1056 Washington to FCO London, 15 September 2001, ‘US Terrorist
Attacks: Wider Foreign
Policy
Implications’.
36
Bush
GW. Decision
Points. Virgin
Books, 2010.
37
Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States.
The 9/11
Commission Report. Norton.
324