5 |
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to
March 2003
171.
Ms Adams
informed Lord Goldsmith on 10 January that a meeting with
Mr Blair
had been
arranged, at No.10’s request, for noon on 14 January. There would
be
a full
Cabinet discussion on 16 January and arrangements were being made
for
Lord Goldsmith
to attend.
172.
Ms Adams told
the Inquiry she had prepared a submission analysing
the
arguments
as she saw them and including her own view, which was essentially
the
same as
that of Mr Wood. Lord Goldsmith then made comments on it which
she adopted
to produce
a draft advice.67
173.
Lord
Goldsmith’s draft advice stated that it was “clear that resolution
1441”
contained
“no express authorisation by the Security Council for the use of
force”.68
174.
The revival
argument had been relied on by the UK in the past but it
would:
“… not be
defensible if the Council has made it clear either that action
short of the
use of
force should be taken to ensure compliance with the cease-fire or
that it
intends to
decide subsequently what action is required …”69
175.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote that OP1 contained a finding that Iraq was in material
breach
of its
obligations, but it was accepted that the effect of the “firebreak”
in OP 2 was that
resolution
1441 did not immediately revive the authorisation to use force in
resolution
678. In his
view:
“The key
question in relation to the interpretation of resolution 1441 is
whether the
terms of
[operative] paragraph 12 … indicate that the Council has reserved
to itself
the power
to decide on what further action is required to enforce the
cease-fire in the
event of a
further material breach by Iraq.
“… to
answer this question, it is necessary to analyse the terms of
resolution 1441
as a whole
…”
176.
In his
analysis, Lord Goldsmith made the following
observations:
•
The
references to resolution 678 (1990) and resolution 687 (1991) in
preambular
paragraphs
4, 5 and 10 of the resolution suggested “that the Council had
the
revival
argument in mind” when it adopted the resolution.
•
The
reference to “material breach” in OP1 signified “a finding by the
Council of a
sufficiently
serious breach of the cease-fire conditions to revive the
authorisation
in
resolution 678”.
•
The “final
opportunity” in OP2 implied that the Council had “determined
that
compliance
with resolution 1441” was Iraq’s “last chance before the
cease-fire
resolution
will be enforced”.
67
Public
hearing, 30 June 2010, pages 20-22.
68
Minute
Adams to Attorney General, 10 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Resolution
1441’.
69
Minute
[Draft] [Goldsmith to Prime Minister], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq:
Interpretation of Resolution 1441’.
37