The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1168. Mr Drummond suggested that Ministers would want to agree the proposals in the

joint minute:

“… provided they are satisfied that:

• UK Forces will be capable of providing security for an area around Basra

including about 20 percent of Iraq’s population.

• How long will we have this responsibility, and what is the exit strategy

(benign security environment created, UK forces replaced by others). Will

we be able to limit ‘our area’ to say Basra by the autumn, when we want to

withdraw two‑thirds of our troops?

• That the assertion that the transitional administration will handle civil

administration including humanitarian reconstruction issues is correct: This

is clearly the plan, but it must be doubtful that ORHA will have the capacity,

and therefore the troops on the ground may be called on to help. The UK

certainly doesn’t have civilian capacity to help govern 20 percent of Iraq.”

1169. The joint minute was not discussed at the Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq at 10am on

20 March, where Mr Blair stated that decisions on the minute were needed at the next

meeting on 21 March.502

1170. Mr Rycroft showed the Straw/Hoon joint minute on the UK military contribution

to post-conflict Iraq to Mr Blair on 20 March. Mr Rycroft commented:

“For discussion at 1500 on Friday [21 March]. Do you agree? Key points to fix

are: size of our sector, length of time of commitment, exit strategy, proper UN

authorisation.”503

1171. On the eve of the invasion, there remained considerable uncertainty about

the three phase model for post-conflict Iraq.

1172. In the absence of UN authorisation for post-conflict activity or agreement

on a UN role, the model, as understood by the UK, remained as much aspiration

as plan.

1173. Asked by the Inquiry whether, on the eve of the invasion, there had been a

reasonably clear understanding of the UK’s military, political and diplomatic objectives

for Phase IV, Mr Chilcott replied:

“Yes, I think the UK view of it was well understood within the UK Government,

and I have no reason to think it wasn’t well understood in the UK military as well,

which was that we were working on broadly this three-phase model in our minds

that we would have a period of occupation, where we would be governed by, as

502 Minutes, 20 March 2003, Ad Hoc Meeting on Iraq.

503 Manuscript comment Rycroft to Prime Minister, 20 March 2003, on Minute Straw and Hoon to

Prime Minister, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution to post-conflict Iraq’.

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