14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
manufacturer,
was “not yet on contract” to provide the vehicles but IPT was
“maturing
the
Business Case” and “negotiating with both the United States Marine
Corps (USMC)
and the
manufacturer”. The USMC held “considerable influence” over Force
Protection
Inc’s
production “as it accounts for a significant proportion of the
manufacturer’s
order book”.
721.
DCRS advised
that the MOD’s request for additional Mastiff vehicles would
be
considered
at the next US Joint Chiefs of Staff on 11 October. Without its
approval,
Force
Protection Inc was unable to make any commitment to the
MOD.
722.
On
presentational advice, DCRS stated that “any attempt to directly
influence
the US
Congressional process would be unhelpful and so an announcement”
should
be
“considered carefully”. It added that an announcement would,
“however”, offer
“significant
advantages” because it “would illustrate the Department’s intent
to
procure
additional protected mobility vehicles, in order to improve force
protection
and operational
effectiveness”.
723.
The UOR for an
additional 147 Mastiff vehicles for Afghanistan was submitted
to
the IAB by
DEC(GM) and the Specialist Utility Vehicle IPT on 4
October.393
That
would
increase
the total Mastiff fleet to 280: 76 for Iraq and 204 for
Afghanistan. Of Iraq’s 76
vehicle
allocation, 54 would be deployed (including eight ambulances) and
there would
be 22
vehicles in the training fleet (including two
ambulances).
724.
The UOR stated
that an additional 26 vehicles were to be deployed “to the
user”
by 31 April
2008. That would meet Iraq’s requirement but would leave
Afghanistan with
insufficient
vehicles “to meet the operational, training and maintenance
requirements”.
There were
currently 49 Mastiff vehicles available in Iraq, with 18 vehicles
in the UK in
a training
pool shared with operations in Afghanistan.
725.
While it had
been “originally envisaged that Vector would be suitable
to
provide
the bulk of the protected mobility” in Afghanistan, it was
“now clear that the
situation,
threat, mission and nature of operations demand[ed] a different
capability”.
A
“comprehensive review of protected mobility” in Afghanistan had
shown that “the
capabilities
required for the bulk of the combat troops are best met by a
combination of
ATV(P)
Viking and Mastiff”.
726.
The UOR stated
that Mastiff was “now essential to operations on Op
TELIC”.
It was
“the most appropriate vehicle for long distance convoy escort
operations where
movement is
canalised on the main supply routes” between the Contingent
Operating
Base and
Kuwait, where logistic elements were based. It was “not possible”
to draw
down Iraq’s
Mastiff fleet to support Afghanistan without an impact on
operations.
It added:
“The shortfall in ambulances with commensurate protection and
mobility
is constraining
commanders (or forcing them to take risk).”
393
Minute
DEC(GM) to IAB Sec, 4 October 2007, ‘MASTIFF Urgent Operational
Requirement (UOR) Uplift
IQ4165/AO1082
Review Note’.
125