14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
We shall
continue to seek out opportunities to improve and enhance our
deployed
helicopter
fleets … but I believe that we are on the right path towards an
enduring
and
sustainable capability which will allow us to fulfil our key tasks,
delivering upon
our
important commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan.”
1272.
A report of
Mr Ainsworth’s visit to Iraq in December 2007
stated:
“Concerns
were raised with regard to ISTAR provision, which had decreased
over
recent
months, but which would become increasingly important in the
overwatch
posture;
there had been successes – such as Hermes 450 – but the
withdrawal
of
capabilities such as the Danish … helicopter and Scan Eagle were
significant
1273.
Mr Ainsworth
was briefed by key personnel involved in manning and operating
the
C‑RAM
system:
“He was
reassured to hear that its success rate in interdicting IDF rounds
continued
to improve
although he noted that there was still some way to go.
He was
particularly
struck by the extent to which the general perception of
C‑RAM’s
capability
had turned around since his last visit, with personnel at all
levels praising
its hugely
positive impact on morale.”
1274.
On 9 January
2008, a junior officer in MND(SE) produced a review of
ISTAR
capability
within MND(SE) for PJHQ.666
He
explained that the move to Provincial Iraqi
Control
(PIC) in the UK’s AOR had:
“…
necessitated a wholesale review of ISTAR capability to support the
MND(SE)
mission.
This has occurred at a time when there is a noticeable reduction
in
the ISTAR
assets and capabilities provided by organic and
MNC‑I/Theatre
platforms.
This is now affecting MND(SE)’s ability to prosecute operations
against
irreconcilable
Shia extremists and will constrain MND(SE) in delivering its
missions
and tasks
…”
1275.
The officer
made a number of recommendations including bringing forward
the
Astor and
Raptor programmes, introducing an aircraft such as Defender to
enable
low‑level
support to ground forces and the introduction of a weaponised UAV
capability.
1276.
The officer
stated that MND(SE) could find no record of “a formal
ISTAR
Estimate”
having been conducted and “rather an iterative approach” had been
adopted,
“resulting
in a fragmented approach to ISTAR” that had led to capability
gaps.
1277.
Considering
the FMV capability, the officer explained that there were “a number
of
Corps
assets” but MND(SE) was having “less success in securing these” and
two assets
665
Minute
PS/Min(AF) to APS/SofS [MOD], 10 January 2008, ‘Minister(AF)’s
Visit to Iraq
17‑21
December’.
666
Minute COS
MND(SE) to ACOS J2 PJHQ, 9 January 2008, ‘Review of ISTAR
Capability Within
MND(SE)’.
215