The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
922.
The role of UK
forces had developed during the operation, initially
providing
reconnaissance,
medical and logistic support but expanding to include a Quick
Reaction
Force
deployed to the outskirts of Basra to help extract the ISF. This
was “wholly
consistent”
with overwatch. Mr Browne would tell the House of Commons that
afternoon
that there
would be a pause in troop reductions until the position
clarified.
923.
Mr Browne
observed that it would be some time before the full implications of
the
operation
were clear. It could have positive effects, including the direct
engagement of
Muqtada
al-Sadr in politics.
924.
Mr Brown
said that Ministers would have a further discussion of the
implications
of recent
events at NSID(OD), but the events in Basra had demonstrated the
perennial
difficulties
in Iraq. By acting early and without adequate planning, the Charge
of the
Knights had
exposed weaknesses in the ISF.
925.
When NSID(OD)
met later that day, Mr Brown recognised that it was difficult
to
take firm
decisions on longer term options until there was a clearer
assessment of
events in
Basra.456
It was good
that the Iraqi Army had sought to take control, but
the
way in
which it had done so threatened to have a negative impact on
political and
economic
progress, as well as the security gains achieved by UK forces. The
UK “could
not afford
to be perceived to be irrelevant to the situation in
Basra”.
926.
Mr Browne
observed that there were now US forces involved in Basra, and
they
were
unlikely to leave. It was becoming clear that JAM1 was “a spent
force”. The UK’s
relations
with Prime Minister Maliki had deteriorated severely and would need
to be
repaired.
927.
ACM Stirrup
reported that present events in Basra did not affect the
expectation
that the UK
could complete its residual military mission in Basra by the end of
the year.
928.
Ministers
agreed that troop levels should remain at 4,100 until the situation
became
clearer and
that no decision on longer-term military commitment should be taken
at
present.
Departments were commissioned to produce an assessment of current
events
in Basra
before Mr Brown’s visit to Washington.
929.
Concluding the
discussion, Mr Brown said that hopes for political and
economic
stability
to take hold in Basra had been “set back”. The UK needed to wait
and assess
the
implications of events “but work to bring our political and
economic objectives back
on
line”.
930.
Lt Gen
Houghton briefed the Chiefs of Staff on 1 April that the violence
across Iraq
that had
erupted in the wake of the Charge of the Knights had been the worst
seen since
June
2007.457
More than
half of the attacks had occurred in Baghdad. However,
less
456
Minutes, 1
April 2008, NSID(OD) meeting.
457
Minutes, 1
April 2008, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
354