3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
the United
States see the United Nations playing, and what was the United
States
planning to
do about the Middle East Peace Process?”182
464.
Sir David said
he had told Mr Armitage that he “didn’t think we had answers
to
those
questions”. Mr Armitage had replied that he thought they needed a
lot more work
and that:
“It was better to be right than to hurry.”183
465.
During his
visit to Washington, Sir David Manning told President Bush
that
Mr Blair
agreed Saddam Hussein had to go, but it would be impossible for
the
UK to
take part in any action against Iraq unless it went through the
UN.
466.
Sir David
reported that President Bush had been “very struck” by Mr
Blair’s
emphasis on
an ultimatum; and that he had not yet made up his mind. Mr
Blair
should push
the need for action through the UN and an ultimatum “very
hard”
in his
telephone call with President Bush on 31 July.
467.
Sir David
Manning delivered the Note from Mr Blair to President Bush to
Dr Rice
on 29
July.184
Sir David
told the Inquiry that he and Dr Rice had discussed the
Note
during
dinner. He had told her that, as the Note made clear:
•
“Britain
could only take part in any policy if it was part of a coalition
which went
through the
United Nations.”
•
The “Middle
East Peace Process was absolutely critical”.
•
“[S]o was
the effort … to explain why Iraq was an issue and why we felt we
had
to tackle
it.”
468.
Sir David told
the Inquiry that he had also set out the questions he had raised
with
Mr
Armitage.
469.
Sir David
Manning’s record of his discussion with Dr Rice for Mr Blair
advised that
he had
indicated that the Note was sent personally to the President and
not intended
for wider
circulation.185
Sir David
had concluded President Bush wanted the UK to be
involved.
There was some reluctance in the US Administration (to involve the
UN), but
Mr Blair
“just might persuade” President Bush. If he did, that would
“transform the public
relations
campaign and make action much easier to manage”.
470.
A meeting in
early September had also been discussed which would
allow
President
Bush to hear “directly” what Mr Blair had to say.
471.
Sir David
cautioned that, until then, Mr Blair should “not … commit”
himself
“formally
and finally to anything, except moral support … Leaving things open
may
182
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 16-17.
183
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 16-17.
184
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 17-18.
185
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 31 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
81