9.2 | 23 May 2003 to June 2004

392. Sir Jeremy Greenstock responded on 19 September to say that “discussion

of possible timings for the political process needs to take more careful account of

the variables”.227

393. Sir Jeremy reported that “indications that the CPC [Constitutional Preparatory

Committee] would recommend elections to the Constitutional Conference … are being

tempered”, he did not sense that there was “real momentum” within the GC to press for

the transfer of executive power quickly. Ambassador Bremer was encouraging the GC to

come up with a timetable for the Seven Steps.

394. Sir Jeremy recommended that a “sensible strategy is to be serious about the

Seven Steps, but to watch carefully, and try to affect the outcome of, the variables”.

Those variables were, in his view: security incidents, Iraqi public reaction, Iraqi political

developments and securing external resources.

395. When they spoke on 16 September, Mr Blair and President Bush agreed to hold

regular video conferences, “usually weekly”.228

396. On 17 September, General Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, sent a report

of his visit to Iraq to Gen Walker.229

397. On troop numbers, Gen Jackson wrote:

“GOC MND(SE) … does not require a third additional battalion … at the moment

and is confident that he can meet any potential tasks that arise from the essential

services short-term plan. There is therefore no requirement for an additional brigade

HQ at this stage. This may change and we need to remain responsive to the needs

of the GOC. I see a requirement to establish a mechanism that earmarks forces …

at an appropriate notice to move.”

398. Gen Jackson reported:

“The threats to Coalition and indigenous security stem from a wide variety of

sources including organised crime, former regime loyalists (FRL) and international

terrorism. Attacks are focussed against both Coalition troops and infrastructure,

whilst organised crime, looting and smuggling continue to erode essential services

… At every level the Coalition is finding it difficult to obtain a cohesive picture of

these various threats.”

399. Gen Jackson proposed moving the focus of intelligence-gathering assets away

from the search for weapons of mass destruction and towards counter-terrorism.

227 Telegram 175 IraqRep to FCO London, 19 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Political Process’.

228 Letter Cannon to Adams, 16 September 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Video Conference with Bush,

16 September 2003’.

229 Minute CGS to CDS, 17 September 2003, ‘CGS Visit to Op.TELIC 12-15 Sep 03’.

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