The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
417.
Although
some of that debate within the UK Government may well
have
reached
military commanders in Iraq, the evidence set out in this
Section
shows that,
in the end, the decision to advance into Basra was made by
military
commanders
on the ground.
418.
It
reflected their judgement that the preconditions for the operation,
set out
in the MOD
advice to Mr Hoon of 5 April, had been met.
419.
In a
post-operation tour interview, conducted at the Army’s Land Warfare
Centre,
Maj Gen
Brims said:
“The raids
themselves [in Basra] were going in ever more successfully
too.
On 5 April
the battlegroup raids were staying in longer in each time, in
essence they
were doing
[battlegroup vehicle checkpoints] coming back only at night because
the
enemy could
get too close. But on Sunday 6 April the Black Watch launched a
raid
and met no
resistance. I consulted Commander 7 [Armoured] Brigade
[Brigadier
Binns] and
gave out radio orders. We got into Basra that day and
stayed …
I did
remember to get clearance from [the Coalition Forces Land
Component
Commander,
Lt Gen McKiernan] beforehand.” 261
420.
Lt Gen Brims
told the Inquiry:
“When we
first got into Basra, it took about a day of combat activity to get
in there
on 6
April. By 7 April, we were in and we were reasonably well received
…”262
421.
Lt Gen Brims
also stated:
“We
produced a generic plan [for Basra] and one of the first things I
did when I
realised
that we had in fact got into Basra and we were controlling the
city, is I got
together
through an individual I approached and asked him to form a
provisional
council
from which we would then use the Iraqis to help us organise Basra
…” 263
422.
Maj Gen Binns
told the Inquiry:
“… I didn’t
really have a clear idea of how we were going to enter
Basra.
The operational
analysts were saying, ‘It will take you three months, you will
suffer
25 percent
casualties and there will be thousands if not tens of thousands of
civilian
deaths’ and
Robin Brims and I then had a conversation, ‘Well we can’t do that
and
therefore
we’ve got to come up with a different way of doing it, so we will
only enter
Basra,
hopefully on our terms, when the time is right and in a manner that
reduces
casualties
on both sides’ …
“… and I
remember a conversation … if Baghdad falls Basra might fall … we
might
just drive
in. And then another conversation, ‘Well actually it would be good
to have
261
Transcript
Land Warfare Centre, 8 January 2004, Op TELIC
Interview.
262
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 35.
263
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 33.
76