The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
to what
the Government’s position would be in the event that three
Permanent Members
of the
Security Council vetoed a second resolution, Mr Straw
replied:
“We have
made it clear throughout that we want a second resolution for
political
reasons,
because a consensus is required, if we can achieve it, for any
military
action. On
the legal basis for that, it should be pointed out that resolution
1441 does
not require
a second resolution.”234
597.
Asked by
Mr Simon Thomas (Plaid Cymru) to remind the House “exactly of
which
part of
resolution 1441 authorises war”, Mr Straw said:
“I am
delighted to do so. We start with paragraph 1, which says that the
Security
Council
‘Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its
obligations
under
relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 … in particular
through Iraq’s
failure to
cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to
complete
the actions
required under paragraph 8 to 13 of resolution 687’.
“We then go
to paragraph 4, in which the Security Council ‘Decides that
false
statements
or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to
this
resolution
and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and co-operate
fully in
the
implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further
material breach of
Iraq’s
obligations” – Obligations of which it is now in breach. We turn to
operative
paragraph
13, in which the Security Council ‘Recalls, in that context, that
the Council
has
repeatedly warned Iraq that it will face serious consequences as a
result of its
continued
violations of its obligations’.”235
598.
Mr Blair
discussed the legal basis for the use of military force, and the
need to
avoid a
detailed discussion in Cabinet, in a bilateral meeting with Lord
Goldsmith on
599.
There is no
record of that discussion in either the No.10 or Attorney
General’s
papers sent
to the Inquiry.
600.
In his
statement for the Inquiry, Lord Goldsmith confirmed that the
meeting had
taken place
at 0930 but he could not recall the detail of the discussion. He
added that it
“would have
been my first meeting” with Mr Blair since he had submitted
his advice of
7 March:
“I expect that I would have gone over the main points of my advice
with him.”237
234
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 10 March
2003, column 24.
235
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 10 March
2003, column 34.
236
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq Military: 1300
Meeting’.
237
Statement,
4 January 2011, pages 13-14.
108