10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
398.
The briefing
also stated that the World Bank had agreed to channel
US$21m from
its Trust
Fund to a power project in Najibiyah, through DFID’s IISP. The
Najibiyah project
had,
however, floundered in the absence of Iraqi Government support;
DFID was
exploring
“all possible alternative options” for the funding.
399.
On 30
September, Mr Dinham sent Sir Nigel Sheinwald a paper
providing an
“honest
assessment” of progress on reconstruction, following a discussion
between
Mr Dinham
and Sir Nigel earlier that month.232
400.
The DFID paper
listed the achievements that had been made in
re-establishing
the
economy, electricity generation, water and sanitation, employment,
education,
health, and
transport and communications. DFID also listed factors which had
hindered
reconstruction:
•
insecurity,
which meant that few other donors had a presence on the
ground
in Iraq;
•
poor
co-ordination and little buy-in from the Iraqi Government and
local
authorities;
•
limited
capacity of Iraqi institutions and rapid turnover of political
figures;
•
“large
additional funds … are unlikely to accelerate progress on
reconstruction
without
corresponding policy and institutional reform and capacity
building”;
•
security
costs had “eaten into” reconstruction funds;
•
the US had
been “distracted by hotspot cities” at the expense of a
“strategic
reconstruction
programme”. Significant amounts of US funding had been
re‑allocated
from basic services to tackle security and oil;
•
problems
with the sustainability of large-scale projects; and
•
unrealistic
Iraqi and international expectations. In other countries, DFID
allowed
between
five and 15 years for “the first phase of governance projects”, to
allow
time for
institutional culture to change. In Iraq, international partners
were trying
to reform
institutions in less than two years.
“A
carefully balanced approach is needed: on the one hand, an
acceptance of the
realistic
pace of reconstruction will help to manage expectations and
encourage
more
sustainable, long-term projects; on the other hand, some
continuation of
high‑profile,
short-term activity will be needed to provide signs of visible
progress
while
longer-term activity is under way.”
232
Letter
Dinham to Sheinwald, 30 September 2005, ‘Iraq: Reconstruction
Situation’ attaching Paper
DFID,
[undated], ‘DFID Information Note on Reconstruction Progress in
Iraq’.
263