The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
721.
Asked whether
Mr Blair’s knowledge of the SIS reporting, of 11 September,
could
have
influenced Mr Blair, Sir Richard Dearlove
replied:
“… if you
look at what he … actually says ‘beyond doubt on the
assessed
intelligence’,
this isn’t part of the assessed intelligence.”398
722.
The ISC also
considered the statement that Mr Blair believed “the
assessed
intelligence
has established beyond doubt” that Saddam Hussein “continues in
his
efforts to
develop nuclear weapons”.399
723.
The ISC
pointed out that the Executive Summary and main body of the
dossier
were less
certain:
•
The
Executive Summary stated: “As a result of the intelligence, we
judge Iraq
has …
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.”
•
The dossier
itself stated that there was “intelligence that Iraq has sought
the
supply of
significant quantities of uranium from Africa”.
724.
Although
there were some references to Iraq having a “nuclear
programme”,
the JIC
Assessments and the dossier made clear that Iraq’s efforts to
develop a
nuclear
weapon were effectively constrained by the dismantling of its
physical
infrastructure
by the IAEA and continuing sanctions.
725.
There was
intelligence which indicated: attempts to procure
dual-use
equipment
which could be used in a nuclear programme; possible attempts
to
obtain
uranium; and that Iraq had retained the knowledge and personnel
from
its previous
programme.
726.
But neither
the JIC Assessments at the time nor the judgements in
the
Executive
Summary of the dossier supported the statement that the
“assessed
intelligence
has established beyond doubt” that Saddam Hussein
“continues
in his
efforts to develop nuclear weapons”.
727.
The JIC
Assessment of 1 December 2000 stated:
•
Iraq had
“retained the scientific cadre associated with nuclear weapons
work
[…]
Unconfirmed intelligence indicates Iraqi
interest in acquiring uranium and
continuing
nuclear weapons related research after the Gulf War.
None of
the
intelligence acquired since the war is ‘smoking gun’ evidence. But
it remains
suspicious
and seems indicative of attempts to retain a cadre of expertise,
which
will
decline over time without international access.”
398
Private
hearing, 13 July 2010, page 31.
399
Intelligence
and Security Committee, Iraqi
Weapons of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and
Assessments,
September 2003, Cm5972, paragraph 88.
254