The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
been clear
that it is not a matter of the UN leading, or the Coalition
leading. The two
should work
together. That is exactly what the resolution
stipulates.”
In a
statement to Parliament that day, Ms Short explained:
“The
Coalition does not have sovereign authority and has no authority to
bring into
being an
Interim Iraqi Government with such authority or to create a
constitutional
process
leading to the election of a sovereign Government. The only body
that
has the
legal authority to do this is the United Nations Security Council …
the UK
Government
… are supporting the US in trying to bully the Security Council
into a
resolution
that gives the coalition power to establish an Iraqi Government and
control
the use of
oil for reconstruction, with only a minor role for the UN … I am
ashamed
that the UK
Government have agreed the resolution that has been tabled in New
York
and shocked
by the secrecy and lack of consultation with Departments with
direct
responsibility
for the issues referred to in the resolution.”208
Mr Stephen
Pattison, Head of the FCO’s UN Department in London, who was
involved in
negotiating
the resolution, told the Inquiry that:
“When it
was clear that Clare Short’s position in Cabinet was I think
more
uncomfortable
than one might have expected, which was towards the end of
the
negotiation
of this resolution, a decision was taken not to involve them
[DFID]”.209
Mr Straw
told the Inquiry that he had taken that decision, and thought that
it had happened
after he
had understood that Ms Short intended to resign: “I think that I
got wind of this,
and I think
the reason was that I had decided we had settled the policy. We
knew what the
parameters
were. We just had to get on with it. So that was the
reason.”210
334.
Sir David
Manning visited Washington and discussed the post-conflict
resolution
with Dr
Rice and Mr Bellinger on 13 May, both of whom were reported to be
“optimistic
that we can
push the UNSCR to a vote next week”.211
335.
Mr Bellinger
briefed on the Security Council experts’ discussion of the
resolution
text, in
which they had raised questions on the IIA (and the UN’s role in
establishing it),
the use of
the Iraq Assistance Fund (but not Coalition control of it), funding
of UN costs
and the
absence of UNMOVIC from the disarmament process.
336.
Dr Rice
explained that the US was working on text covering disarmament
to
add into
the resolution. It was agreed that Ambassador Negroponte and Sir
Jeremy
Greenstock
should brief the Security Council on Coalition activity in Iraq the
next day.
208
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 12 May
2003, columns 36-39.
209
Public
hearing, 31 January 2011, page 100.
210
Public
hearing, 2 February 2011, page 135.
211
Telegram
643 Washington to FCO London, 13 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Meetings with
Rice and Cheney,
13
May’.
188