The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“My public
pronouncements – especially at Crawford … and in the speech the
next
day, could
have left no-one in any doubt as to my position.”300
735.
In his
statement, Mr Blair wrote that there had been “a full Cabinet
discussion” after
the visit
on 11 April “where we set out our objectives”, and
that:
“The issues
were regularly debated in Cabinet. I was answering questions on
it,
giving
press interviews. It was a dominant news issue. I was constantly
interacting
on it,
therefore, with colleagues, MPs and the media, and in the most
plain terms.”301
736.
Asked if the
meeting with President Bush at Crawford had been a turning
point,
Mr Blair
told the Inquiry:
“It wasn’t
a turning point. It was really that all the way through we were
saying this
issue now
has to be dealt with. So Saddam either comes back into compliance
with
UN
resolutions or action will follow.”302
737.
As a means
to sustain international support for a policy of containment
and
improve its
effectiveness, the UK continued to pursue agreement to measures
for
implementation
of the smarter economic sanctions regime, agreed in
November
2001, in
the first months of 2002.
738.
But
continuing divisions between Permanent Members of the
Security
Council
meant there was no agreement on the way forward on the
re-admission
of weapons
inspectors and establishing the verification and monitoring
regime
identified
in resolution 1284 (1999). Without inspections, there was no route
for
Iraq to
secure the lifting of economic sanctions.
739.
There were
clear signals from Washington that the US Administration
was
determined
to deal with Iraq and key figures were contemplating military
action
to achieve
regime change.
740.
The JIC
assessment of 27 February and the Cabinet Office ‘Options
Paper’
of 8 March
concluded that a large scale ground invasion was the only sure
way
to remove
Saddam Hussein.
741.
In public
statements at the end of February and in the first week of
March
2002, Mr
Blair and Mr Straw set out the view that Iraq was a threat which
had to
be dealt
with.
300
Statement,
14 January 2011, pages 3-4.
301
Statement,
14 January 2011, page 4.
302
Public
hearing, 21 January 2011, page 8.
524