The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
the
circumstances under which the employee became a Ba’ath Party
member
and was
promoted to the fourth tier of membership;
•
employment
history, including links to Ba’athist military, intelligence or
security
services;
•
whether
during their time in office the employee was dedicated to
furthering the
goals of
the Ba’ath Party;
•
any illegal
activities by the employee;
•
whether the
skills of the employee were rare or replaceable; and
•
whether the
individual had attained fourth‑tier membership solely as a result
of
having been
a prisoner of war in the Iran‑Iraq conflict (there was a
presumption
that this
group of individuals should retain their employment).
128.
Appeals to the
local de‑Ba’athification Review Committees were to be
processed
within six
weeks. A panel of two judges, nominated by the Iraqi Council of
Judges and
approved by
the GC, would sit on Dr Chalabi’s Commission for the purpose
of hearing
appeals,
and one of these would be required to agree and sign the appeal
decision.
Exemptions
to the bar on public employment could be granted either for life or
for
a one‑year
probationary period. A probationary exemption could be revoked if
the
individual
was found to have fabricated evidence, if new evidence came to
light, or
if the
individual re‑engaged in Ba’athist activities.
129.
Sir David
Manning, who had been appointed British Ambassador to the
US,
reported a
member of the Department of Defense describing the new appeal
process
130.
Ambassador
Bremer told the Inquiry that “it was a mistake for the CPA to
devolve
the
implementation of the de‑Ba’athification programme to Iraqi
politicians who then
attempted
to broaden the decree’s effect”.116
He
suggested that a wiser move would
have been
to set up a judicial panel to oversee implementation.
131.
In early
February 2004, Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that Ambassador
Bremer
had been
lobbying the GC President on the need to ensure that the provisions
in the
Transitional
Administrative Law (TAL) on who could qualify to stand for election
to the
Transitional
National Assembly were not drawn too tightly and did not exclude
junior
Ba’athists
or those who had been exempted by Dr Chalabi’s Commission from
standing
for
election.117
The
development of the TAL is covered in Section 9.2.
115
Telegram 75
Washington to FCO London, 16 January 2004, ‘Visit of the House of
Commons Defence
Committee
to the US, 11‑15 January’.
116
Statement
Bremer, 18 May 2010, page 5.
117
Telegram
032 IraqRep to FCO London, 2 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Political
Process: TAL Update’.
28