The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
131.
Sir Derek took
“issue too with John [Sawers]’s caricature of ‘conventional
advice’
in FCO”.
He recognised:
“… the need
to frame our arguments within the US universe of facts. But we
should
not kid
ourselves. UNSCOM [UN Special Commission] ground to a halt
because
the
Security Council was terminally divided … Having UNMOVIC inspectors
on the
ground
would be less risky than a US/UK regime change campaign …
Saddam
knows his
limitations these days.
“… I do not
think we should sign up to a proactive regime change policy until
we
have
satisfactory answers to questions such as those John is posing. We
should not
give the
Americans a blank cheque … [T]he Americans need us on Iraq, and
when
they look
more closely into the abyss they may pause. In any event … from
talking
to American
colleagues … the need for a UN process is recognised In
Washington.
We should
allow that to play through … And we should promote the thought that
a
more
balanced and determined US approach on Palestine would be a
necessary
(but not
sufficient) condition for moving forward on regime change.
Containment has
worked for
11 years. We should not abandon it lightly.”
132.
Sir Derek’s
letter was copied only to Mr Ricketts and Mr Graham Fry,
Deputy
Under
Secretary Wider World, within the FCO.
133.
The letter was
sent to Sir David Manning by Sir Michael Jay’s Private Office
and
was also
seen by Mr Powell.44
134.
Sir Richard
Dearlove advised on 26 February that the US was drawing
up
plans for a
military campaign and considering an ultimatum for the return
of
inspectors
with which Saddam Hussein would be unable to comply.
135.
On 26
February, Sir Richard Dearlove wrote again to Sir David Manning
about
developments
in US thinking and timescales.45
136.
Sir Richard
advised that the US had concluded that containment would not
work
and that
disarming Iraq would be more difficult with each passing year. The
US military
were
drawing up plans for a military campaign later in the year and the
Administration
was
considering the possibility of presenting Saddam Hussein with an
ultimatum for the
return of
inspectors. But, Sir Richard wrote, the bar would be set “so high
that Saddam
would not
be able to comply”.
137.
Sir Richard
reported that his team had told the US that the UK legal position
would
need to be
clarified before the UK could become engaged.
44
Manuscript
comments on Letter Plumbly to Jay, 27 February 2002,
‘Iraq’.
45
Letter C to
Manning, 26 February 2002, ‘US Policy on Iraq’.
410