The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
trying to
resolve the issues of anthrax and VX: “On the remnants of old
programmes
they should
be able to tell us.”
283.
In his
subsequent meeting with Mr Straw, Dr Blix was reported to have
said he had
clear
indications that anthrax had been weaponised and his personal
judgement was
that Iraq
did have programmes and “definitely possessed the ability to
jump-start BW
programmes”.113
The trick
would be to find evidence.
284.
Dr Blix also
told Mr Straw that if the Al Samoud missiles were found to be
illegal,
they would
be destroyed. That could force a real confrontation with the Iraqis
who were
not keen to
lose billions of dollars of armaments at a time when they were
threatened
with
military action.
285.
Dr ElBaradei
was reported to have told Mr Straw that he would press Iraq
hard on
possible
uranium imports and interviews. He did not expect much movement
from Iraq
and tough
messages from the international community could only help the
inspectors.
286.
Mr Straw
encouraged Dr ElBaradei to focus on interviews. Dr ElBaradei
reported
that the
scientists he had interviewed were clearly extremely nervous, but
he saw great
difficulties
with conducting interviews overseas.
287.
Dr ElBaradei
told Mr Blair that:
“Not all
members agreed with the US timing … Iraq was not co-operating.
Unless
there were
clear signs of an Iraqi change of heart on co-operation, (both
process,
including
interviews, and substance), UNSCR 1441 would have to be
implemented.
Not
allowing interviews was a lack of full co-operation … dribbling out
concessions
was not
full co-operation … His 14 February report would be a clear as
possible.”114
288.
In Dr
ElBaradei’s view, CBW (chemical and biological weapons) was the
key.
289.
On nuclear
issues, the inspectors continued to assess the aluminium
tubes.
Reports of
the possible import of uranium were: “Much more disturbing … There
could
only be one
reason for such an import.”
290.
Dr ElBaradei
told Mr Blair that:
“If
satisfactory co-operation was not forthcoming, the next best
outcome would
be to force
Saddam … out … [He] did not oppose more time for inspections.
Any
war would
risk radicalising the region. It should be UN-controlled. As should
the
future Iraq
…”
113
Telegram 79
FCO London to UKMIS New York, 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Meetings
with Blix
and El-Baradei, 6 February’.
114
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meetings
with Blix and El-Baradei,
6 February’.
346