10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
of
prosperity was something that people should value and should not
put at risk by
allowing
the militias to have control in the area.” 468
813.
Mr Brown
discussed Iraq with President Bush at Camp David on 30
July.469
The
meeting
note produced by Mr Brown’s Private Secretary recorded only
that Mr Brown
welcomed
the common ground between himself and President Bush on Iraq and
had
outlined
the UK’s proposals for a “development agency” in
Basra.
814.
Mr Asquith
called on Prime Minister Maliki on 1 August, to deliver
Mr Brown’s
29 July
letter on economic reconstruction and to discuss politics in Basra
and
815.
Mr Asquith
reported that Prime Minister Maliki warmly welcomed Mr Brown’s
letter,
which was
in line with his desire to deepen co-operation with the UK on
issues other
than
security and with his own Government’s focus on economic
development. Prime
Minister
Maliki said that he would approve a request from the Basra
Provincial Council
to establish
the BIPA.
816.
Prime Minister
Maliki said that he was also interested in bigger projects in
the
Basra
region which were national in scope such as the Grand Port project
in the oil
sector,
which would attract large-scale international
investment.
817.
Prime Minister
Maliki also advised that the “troublesome” Governor Waili had
been
legally
dismissed but was appealing that decision, causing a delay in his
removal.
818.
Mr Jones’
weekly report of the same day advised that the Deputy Prime
Minister’s
Office had
identified bringing Basra International Airport up to international
standards
as its top
economic priority in the province, and had requested UK advice on
how to
achieve
that.471
Mr Jones
was pursuing the issue with the RAF and the US.
819.
Prime Minister
Maliki replied to Mr Brown’s letter on 7 October.
820.
Jaysh al-Mahdi
(JAM) in Basra called a month-long cease-fire, beginning
on
13 August.472
Sir John
Scarlett, Chief of SIS, told the Inquiry that:
“… the
cease-fire for a month on 13 August worked straight away. There was
an
immediate
falling away of attacks, and it then carried on. It went beyond the
month
and it
became effectively a permanent feature. So it was remarkably
successful.”
468
Public
hearing, 5 March 2010, pages 38-39.
469
Letter
Clunes to Gould, 31 July 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
President Bush: Iraq […]’.
470
eGram
32637/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 1 August 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
Prime Minister Maliki,
1 August’.
471
Letter
Jones to Aldred, 1 August 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly
Report’.
472
Private
hearing, 10 June 2006, page 41.
327