The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Major
General Peter Wall, Deputy Chief of Joint Operations, attended a
CENTCOM
conference
on the post‑election strategy for Iraq on 21 to 23
February.629
He
reported:
“MNF‑I have
walked back from their original PATs concept, though remained
adamant
that the
principle of hands‑on help to the police would still be required in
areas where
the
insurgency was at its strongest … We are making progress in
MND(SE). But we
also need
to find a way of forcing this issue in Baghdad.”
691.
On 22 April
2005, Gen Casey circulated a paper entitled ‘MNF‑I Campaign
Action
Plan for
2005 – Transition to Self‑Reliance’.630
The paper
stated that the Iraqi Armed
Forces
would be “largely trained and equipped” by mid‑2005 and that
training of the
police and
Border Police would extend into 2006. Gen Casey
wrote:
“Generally,
while Iraqi forces still lack the capacity to conduct and
sustain
independent
counter‑insurgency operations, they now have the capacity to
begin
assuming
the lead in counter‑insurgency operations across the country, and
the
coalition
can begin to progressively transition that responsibility to
them.”
692.
That would be
“executed in four phases”:
•
Phase I,
Implement the Transition Team Concept – MNF‑I would
“establish
partnerships
between Iraqi and coalition units” and embed Transition
Teams
in
designated ISF units by 15 June 2005. Concurrently MNF‑I with IRMO
[Iraq
Reconstruction
and Management Office] advisers would “build capacity
to
continue
the development of ISF leaders, organizations, supporting
institutions
and Iraqi
security Ministries”.
•
Phase II,
Transition to Provincial Iraqi Security Control – coalition
forces
would “pass
the lead for conducting counter‑insurgency operations to
capable
ISF as
conditions warrant”. The goal was to have the ISF in all
provinces
“well‑postured”
to provide security for the elections in December, with
the
coalition’s
visibility reduced.
•
Phase III,
Transition to National Iraqi Security Control – coalition forces
to
“progressively
reduce their levels of support and presence” as the ISF
became
“increasingly
capable”. Given the training timescales, it was “unlikely” that
that
would occur
“before mid‑2006”.
•
Phase IV,
Iraqi Security Self‑Reliance – coalition forces would be
“postured
in
strategic overwatch outside of Iraq with training, security
co‑operation
and
advisory presence remaining”, with the “exact nature” of support
being
“determined
in close co‑ordination with the Government of Iraq”.
629
Minute
DCJO(Ops) to CJO, 28 February 2005, ‘CENTCOM Post Iraqi Election
coalition Conference,
Bucharest
21‑23 Feb 05’.
630
Paper
Casey, 22 April 2005, ‘MNF‑I Campaign Action Plan for 2005 –
Transition to Self‑Reliance’.
208