The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
21.
The Butler
Review was established by Mr Blair in February 2004
to:
“investigate
the intelligence coverage available in respect of WMD programmes
in
countries
of concern and on the global trade in WMD, taking into account what
is
now known
about these programmes;
“as part of
this work, to investigate the accuracy of intelligence on Iraqi WMD
up to
March 2003,
and to examine any discrepancies between the intelligence
gathered,
evaluated
and used by the Government before the conflict, and between
that
intelligence
and what has been discovered by the Iraq Survey Group since the
end
of the
conflict; and to make recommendations to the Prime Minister for the
future
on the
gathering, evaluation and use of intelligence on WMD, in the light
of the
difficulties
of operating in countries of concern.”7
22.
The Butler
Report stated that, in assessing the intelligence on Iraq’s
nuclear,
biological,
chemical and ballistic missile capabilities to establish whether
there were
“any
detectable systemic issues” which might have affected the JIC
Assessments in the
period
before March 2003 and whether Assessments made at the time of the
1990 to
1991 Gulf
Conflict “had a lasting impact which was reflected in JIC
Assessments made
in 2002 and
2003”, it had addressed “three broad questions”:
“•
What was
the quality of the intelligence and other evidence, and
the
assessments
made of it, about the strategic
intent of the
Iraqi regime to pursue
...
programmes in contravention of its obligations under ... resolution
687?
•
What was
the quality of the intelligence or other evidence, and the
assessments
made of it,
about Iraq seeking to sustain and develop its indigenous
knowledge,
skills and
materiel base which would provide it with a ‘break-out’
capability ...?
•
What was
the quality of the intelligence or other evidence, and the
assessments
made of it,
about Iraqi production
or
possession
of
prohibited ... agents and
23.
Sir John
Chilcot was a member of the Butler Review.
24.
The Iraq
Inquiry has drawn in its work on both the evidence offered to
those
Inquiries,
where available, and their analyses and conclusions, but the
judgements in
this Report
are the Inquiry’s own.
25.
The term
“weapons of mass destruction” originated as an umbrella
concept
covering
weapons with the capability to cause indiscriminate loss of life
and wide-scale
destruction.
7
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 3
February 2004, column 625.
8
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraphs
152-153.
4