9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
173.
Lt Gen Rollo
reported to ACM Stirrup that the security situation in MND(SE)
had
been
discussed at the MNF Commanders’ Conference on 5 August where Gen
Petraeus
described
Basra as “complex and difficult”.76
Maj Gen
Shaw’s “injection of an alternative
view of the
Shia south” had prompted “genuine debate”. His view that only
MNF
withdrawal
would allow the Iraqis to sort themselves out, had
drawn:
“… a range
of views – not overtly unsympathetic but querying some of the
logic
of
execution. Petraeus’s own comments were that no-one disputed the
wisdom of
drawing
down forces in Basra, but how it was done was very important. Fleet
St
would not
have our nuanced understanding of the situation and it could be
presented
as a
defeat. We had to make sure that the ISF are adequate, that the
Palace was
not taken
over and ransacked, that Mohan’s plans were coherent and, thinking
more
long-term,
that a Hizballah-type organisation did not take over the
South.”
174.
Ambassador
Crocker told the Conference that he was:
“…
concerned over a failure of governance in Basra in the short term,
and wanted
to explore
further the potential for the GoI to re-establish itself while we
gained
understanding
of our own limited control and influence.”
175.
Lt Gen Rollo
commented:
“Both
responses are legitimate and we need to shape both the message and
the
substance
of our actions.
“We also
need to be careful not to seize on aspects of these comments that
favour
our own
interpretation of potential events. In the short term our ability
to hand over
Basra
Palace is likely to be assessed by Petraeus and the GOI not only on
the state
of the
Palace Guard Force but on the overall security situation in Basra.
This during
August,
which, even without the added potential dynamics of the possible
forcible
removal (by
the Iraqis) of the Governor or our own withdrawal from the City,
is
always a
volatile month. In the medium term PIC should be possible in the
autumn,
with
careful co-ordination with both the Iraqis and MNF(I), better
politics in Basra,
including
hopefully a new governor, a steady build up of Iraqi security
forces and the
isolation
and reduction in influence of criminal and Iranian backed JAM.
Conversely
a Basra in
which JAM have free rein and are busily settling scores with anyone
who
either
co-operated with us or stands in the way of their own criminal
purposes will
provide a
much less attractive backdrop to PIC for both the MNF(I) and the
GOI.
I mention
this not in any way to play Cassandra but because I want to convey
a
sense of
the range of events that we may have to contend with.”
76
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 6 August 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (264) 6 Aug
07’.
215