The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
US
commitment” to help with police reform and training, but the issue
of who manned
the border
with Iran remained a difficult one:
“Our
appreciation of the border is that we need to have a permanent
presence on
the main
crossings, as unless these are controlled they will still offer the
easiest
passage for
lethal aid … that means we should man Shalamcheh and
Sheeb,
which we
do not have enough people for.”
28.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner anticipated that Lt Gen Austin would accept that
the
UK could
not be responsible for Maysan and that the US would provide the
guard
force at
Sheeb. In return, they would look to the UK to provide a temporary
cover
at Shalamcheh,
at least until the US construction work to create a more
permanent
base there
was complete. Maj Gen White-Spunner commented:
“This will
be painful, but I am inclined to agree to it as otherwise we will
face an open
border
which is not in our interests, as it will allow an ingress of
rockets from Iran
which could
negate much of what has been achieved in Basra and end up
being
fired at us
here in the COB [Contingency Operating Base]. It is also very much
in
our
interest to have responsibility for the Maysan border removed from
us, as it is
potentially
much the most difficult to police.”
29.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner’s report also described “the end of large scale
manoeuvre
operations
by ISF to clear Basra of militia”. Phase VII of Charge of the
Knights met
“limited
resistance and low cache finds”, suggesting that the militias had
fled.
30.
Planning was
also under way to “clear and search” the town of Al
Qurnah,
70km north
of Basra, to which many of the Basra JAM leaders were believed
to
have fled.
31.
On 12 May, Lt
Gen Cooper reported that in relation to Sadr City, Prime
Minister
Maliki “was
dissuaded by Petraeus and Crocker from launching a premature
major
ground
offensive”.8
Following
negotiations between the Iraqi authorities and the
Office
of the
Martyr Sadr (OMS), a peace deal was announced on 10 May, to come
into effect
the following
day. The terms of the deal included:
•
the right
of the ISF to enter Sadr City (without coalition MiTTs in
support);
•
JAM
producing maps and locations of Improvised Explosive Devices
(IEDs);
•
the right
of the Iraqi Government to conduct raids and arrests under
warrant
in pursuit
of weapons;
•
a cessation
of IDF attacks on the International Zone;
•
easier
access into the area for emergency aid; and
•
an
acknowledgement that only the Iraqi Government and its security
forces
had the
right to bear arms.
8
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 12 May 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (300) 12 May
08’.
386