9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
in both
Baghdad and Washington about UK plans in the South. Their concerns
are
centred on
the tension between (what they assume will be) further UK
withdrawals in
the South,
and the US military surge in Baghdad and its surrounding
provinces.”
344.
During the
video conference, Mr Brown said that the departure from
Basra
Palace had
been smooth; he told President Bush that “elements of the media
had
misrepresented
our strategy, and our long-term objectives”.176
The next
steps, including
transition
to PIC in Basra, had to be based on a military assessment.
Mr Brown
explained
that he intended to make a Parliamentary statement on Iraq in early
October
but there
would be no “hasty decisions” in the meantime.
345.
At Cabinet on
11 September, Mr Browne commented that Gen Petraeus’
evidence
had been
less dramatic than billed: security in Baghdad had increased, and
large scale
sectarian
violence in Iraq had decreased.177
The US
would wish to sustain its forces at
a higher
level until 2008, to provide opportunities for political progress,
although overall
numbers
would reduce. By July 2008 the total would be 130,000; the
pre-surge level.
Mr Browne
told Cabinet that the US was essentially adopting the same approach
the
UK had
taken in the South; making reductions where security could be
handed over
to the
Iraqis.
346.
Mr Browne
reported that the transfer of Basra Palace on 3 September
had
taken place
without incident and the city was calm. British forces were now
focused
on
mentoring and training, although they would retain a capability to
re-intervene if
necessary.
Force levels would reduce to around 5,000 in November, with PIC
expected
at around
the same time, conditions permitting. Future plans would, in part,
depend on
US
decisions.
347.
Mr Miliband
observed that the UK’s focus had, inevitably, been on Basra for
the
last two to
three years, but it was important now to think about the nature of
the UK’s
overall
relationship with Iraq, in the context of the wider international
community. He
believed
that there was a chance to persuade the European Union to develop
serious
economic
and social relationships with Iraq.
348.
Mr Brown
concluded the discussion by saying that, over the next few weeks,
the
Government
would need to look at security, reconciliation (where the emphasis
was
moving from
the national to the local level) and the “stake in the future”
initiative. Cabinet
would have
a further opportunity to discuss the issue at an appropriate time
as matters
became
clearer.
176
Letter
Fletcher to Hickey, 10 September 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush,
10 September:
Middle East’.
177
Cabinet
Conclusions, 11 September 2007.
249