The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
598.
SIS did not
gain direct access to Curve Ball until early 2004.232
599.
The US
Commission on WMD reported that the CIA had doubts about Curve
Ball
from summer
2003:
“Any
remaining doubts, however, were removed when the CIA was finally
given
access to
Curve Ball himself in March 2004. At that time, Curve Ball’s
inability to
explain
discrepancies in his reporting, his description of facilities and
events, and
his general
demeanor led to the conclusion that his information was unreliable
…
Having
concluded that Curve Ball had fabricated his reporting, CIA and
Defense
HUMINT
recalled all of it.”233
600.
A senior SIS
officer replied to the questions raised by Mr Blair on 10
June.234
The senior
SIS officer stated that, if intelligence from the sub-source were
withdrawn,
there was:
“… still a
body of intelligence which consistently indicated that Saddam
was
considering
using CBW; that he would be prepared to use it against advancing
allied
forces; and
that he considered possession of CBW vital to the long term
survival of
his
regime.”
601.
The senior SIS
officer also reported that:
•
SIS had
received a large amount of liaison reporting, “about deception
of
UNMOVIC and
the concealment of CBW; and limited reporting on the
military
deployment
of CBW”.
•
SIS was
validating other sources.
•
The CIA had
already formally withdrawn some reporting from Curve Ball but
SIS
continued
to judge that it was “premature to conclude … that all intelligence
from
the source
must be discounted”.
602.
The senior SIS
officer added that, as a result of its discussions with Curve
Ball
earlier in
2004, the “most likely function” of the trailers he had described
was “to
provide a
breakout production capability and not the continual production of
material
for stockpiling”.
603.
Separately,
Mr Tim Dowse, who succeeded Mr Miller as Chief of the
Assessments
Staff in
November 2003, sent Sir Nigel Sheinwald an assessment of
the impact of
concerns
about the reliability of the sourcing chain for the 45 minute
report.235
Mr Dowse
stated that
there were doubts about the sourcing chain which SIS was still
investigating.
232
Letter
[senior SIS officer] to Scarlett, 24 March 2004, ‘CIA Position on
Iraqi TPS Source’.
233
The
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction,
Report to
the President of the United States, 31 March
2005, pages 106-108.
234
Letter
[senior SIS officer] to Sheinwald, 10 June 2004, ‘Butler Review:
Sourcing of 45 Minute Report’.
235
Minute
Dowse to Sheinwald, 18 June 2004, ‘Intelligence on Iraqi WMD:
[…]’.
394