The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
695.
Military
planning for the deployment of UK land forces in northern Iraq
as
part of a
US-led force gathered pace during October 2002.
696.
On 31
October, Adm Boyce advised Mr Blair that a major contribution to
the
military
campaign would reduce pressure on the UK to finance a share of
the
post-conflict
reconstruction effort.
697.
Mr Bowen
informed Sir David Manning on 9 October that the Chiefs of Staff
had
concluded
that a decision in principle in favour of Package 3 in the next few
weeks
would help
the UK to influence US thinking to a greater extent than had been
possible
up to that
point, “especially in relation to the aftermath of any military
action”.343
698.
Section 6.1
sets out the detail of the discussion and the pressures driving
the
debate.
699.
The need for a
decision on the potential UK contribution to any US-led
action
against
Iraq was set out in an urgent minute to Mr Hoon from
Mr Johnson on
11
October.344
Mr Johnson
advised that US thinking on the “Day After” was
“under-
developed
at present” and warned:
“... there
is likely to be a need for a substantial, potentially
long-enduring
commitment
of forces. Assuming that military action had taken place under a
UN
umbrella,
it is likely that the US would look to allies and the UK to play a
major
role in
this, perhaps including providing a framework capability through
the ARRC
[Allied
Rapid Reaction Corps]. We clearly have an interest in minimising
the risk of a
longstanding
commitment … in a part of the world that will not be
retention-positive
for our
personnel: in terms of Defence Planning Assumptions, a rouled
[rotating]
medium
scale PSO [peace support operation] in Iraq would only be
manageable if
our
commitments elsewhere … were capped at small scale. The more
substantial
our
contribution to military action in the first place, the more
plausibly we will be able
to argue
that we have done our bit.”
700.
After a
meeting with senior advisers on 14 October, Mr Hoon wrote to Mr
Blair on
15 October,
seeking a decision that week on whether to tell the US they could
assume a
UK Land
contribution in addition to the air, maritime and Special Forces
package already
offered for
planning purposes.345
Mr Hoon
wrote:
“There is
likely to be a substantial and continuing post-conflict
stabilisation task in
Iraq. If we
do not contribute Package 3, we may be more vulnerable to a US
request
to provide
a substantial force for this potentially open-ended
task.”
343
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 9 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Chiefs of Staff Meeting on
9 October’.
344
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK
Contingency Planning’.
345
Minute Hoon
to Prime Minister, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Options’.
230