9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
37.
In his weekly
update on 5 July, Maj Gen Shaw reported on the meeting
between
General
Mohan and ACM Stirrup, who had concluded that “this was an
individual with
a plan”
and that it was mainly coherent and well
considered.22
38.
Maj Gen Shaw
explained:
“Mohan’s
vision regarding Shia reconciliation cites MNF as a distorting
factor for
Iraqi
nationalist loyalties … Mohan is quite resolute in what he believes
is the
solution:
MNF to adopt a de
facto PIC
overwatch posture, moving out of the city but
able to
provide support and training as required. This will allow him to
harness the
motivation
and mindset of the fundamentally nationalist population, a violent
minority
of which is
currently distracted by the MNF ‘occupiers’ and mark those who work
for
MNF as
collaborators. Mohan recognises that security in Basra cannot be
achieved
by military
means alone and wishes to focus on Shia reconciliation with an
aspiration
to utilise
Shia Iraqi Nationalism to drive a wedge between
mainstream/nationalist
JAM and
militant JAM, exposing its Iranian proxies and tackling the longer
term
Iranian
threat … his focus on the will of the people is one I fully support
…”
39.
But Maj Gen
Shaw cautioned:
“What is
unclear is how … we will retain situational awareness should we, as
he
suggests,
leave the city. Until PIC our de
jure responsibility
for security remains;
keeping ISF
as the first line of response is compatible with moving out of
Basra
Palace, and
we have, as directed since February, successfully de-linked PIC
and
BP [Basra
Palace] in the US and GOI planning, the UK driver being
strategic
sustainment.
To re-link PIC and BP on the basis of the tactical advantages of
a
BP presence
risks compromising our stated strategic position and might
provide
a US hook
for our posture that we might regret … The PJCC [Provincial
Joint
Co‑ordination
Centre] however provides us with situation awareness … of the
city,
something I
am loathe to give up as long as de
jure PIC
responsibility remains.
Nonetheless
today my preference is to move from the PJCC and BP at the
same
time. But
this is fluid … This whole Basra posture is a bargaining chip to
get Mohan
to support
Basra PIC in August. For wider reasons I am prepared to accept
the
risk of
security responsibility for Basra without troops in BP/PJCC for two
months.
Longer than
that and the risk of my successor being exposed rises; in this
case,
strategic
top cover might be required to protect our reputation with the US
…”
40.
Maj Gen Shaw
reported his assessment that for the past month Basra had met
the
conditions
for PIC set by Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, Commander
MNC-I.
He considered
that this argued strongly for Basra being granted PIC in July,
though he
had picked
up some US and Iraqi concern about this timeline:
“The
Iraqis, having finally taken Basra security seriously, may wish to
see new
security
structures … For the US, I sense that a reluctance to take risk,
and a desire
22
Minute Shaw
to CJO, 5 July 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 05
July 2007’.
189