The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
118.
Gen Walker
summarised the conclusion of the Chiefs of Staff, that option six
was
the “best
military option” although “there was current doubt whether it could
be delivered
and
sustained”.
119.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Blair’s Private Secretary for
Foreign
Affairs on
25 May, setting out the Chiefs of Staff’s advice.83
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary
stated that
the option which would have the greatest effect and the least
military risk was
the
deployment of HQ ARRC with an associated battlegroup, and a brigade
to replace
US forces.
However, that option carried “significant penalties” including with
regard to
the wider
impact on the Armed Forces.
120.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Secretary set out those penalties. Deploying HQ ARRC with
an
associated
battlegroup would further reduce tour intervals for many Service
Personnel.
Some 40
percent of infantry soldiers already had tour intervals of less
than 12 months
(against a
guideline of 24 months). The deployment would reduce tour intervals
for
combat
service support units to an average of less than 10 months; some
units would
have even
less.
121.
Reduced tour
intervals would effect training and future capability, and
also
significantly
reduce the time that Service Personnel and their families could
spend
together.
The letter concluded:
“For some,
this may be the straw that breaks the camel’s back and leads
to
experienced
personnel leaving the Service.”
122.
Holding a
brigade at readiness, even if it was not deployed outside the
UK,
would have
even more significant impacts.
123.
Given those
penalties, and the fact that the situation in Iraq would evolve,
Chiefs
recommended
that the Government should deploy HQ ARRC and an
associated
battlegroup
now, but retain the brigade in the UK to be deployed if
necessary.
124.
In late May,
Lt Gen Palmer asked the Chiefs of Staff to agree that he
should
develop a
costed package of measures, focused on protecting untaken leave
and
enhanced
allowances, to ameliorate the “worst consequences” of the
increasing
“operational
load”.84
It was
conceivable that an increase in the UK’s commitment in
Iraq would
reduce tour intervals for some units, including medical units, to
six months.
125.
Lt Gen Palmer
advised that the MOD did not have the management
information
to
determine the extent to which increasing pressure on Service
Personnel would
translate
into worsening retention, or when a “tipping point” in retention
would be
reached
(work was under way to generate that information). Recruitment
and retention
83
Letter
Naworynsky to Rycroft, 25 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Options for a UK
Military Contribution to the
Wider South’.
84
Minute
Palmer to COSSEC, 24 May 2004, ‘Increased Commitments –
Ameliorating the Impact
on People’.
24