The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“In effect,
he has engaged with the local tribes and established a ‘Sons of
Iraq’
programme.
The maturity of this programme seems similar to that for his
overall
Basra
initiative; limited. A combined MNF‑I and MNC‑I team has begun to
work
on possible
recommendations for implementation, but clearly this must be a
GoI
programme
and they may not want any coalition support. A sufficiently
robust
governance
structure will be required to prevent this group turning into
another
armed
militia and a considered approach is needed to prevent them
becoming a
new target
set for JAM. Whilst the establishment of such a programme in
MND(SE)
is
something that the UK has sought to avoid and which we continue to
oppose, our
voice
carries little weight and there is little that we can and ought to
do other than
support the
MNC‑I in developing recommendations.”
1463.
On 14 April,
the CIG reported:
“Intelligence
shows that despite the Government of Iraq’s previously
strong
objections
to tribal awakenings in the South, their proven ability to act as
force
multipliers
for the ISF in Basra and a counter‑balance to JAM is going to be
one of
the key
products of the recent conflict. Intelligence suggests that 500
have already
been
recruited and that Maliki has tasked local tribal leaders to hand
pick others.
Diplomatic
reports suggest that as many as 25,000 have been asked for.
However,
this
additional dynamic to Basra’s security landscape is not without
risk. Inter‑tribal
conflict
may result in places: reporting suggests that JAM already has plans
to
1464.
On 8 July, an
eGram from the British Embassy Office Basra suggested that
the
number
recruited had risen to 7,000, when reporting that the Sons of Iraq
might return
to “the
streets of Basra” because the MOI had not paid
them.1339
General
Adel had asked
for
outstanding salaries to be paid immediately. He also requested “not
to be sent any
more police
officers as he ha[d] enough”.
1465.
On 2 April, a
junior official in PJHQ wrote to Mr Browne, advising him
that
MND(SE) was
intending to embed MiTTs within 14th Division to strengthen
“some of
the key
vulnerabilities that ha[d] been demonstrated during recent
operations”.1340
It
would be
“in a manner akin to the Operational Mentoring Liaison Team (OMLT)
concept
successfully
used in Afghanistan”. The US had “made it clear that they would
welcome”
the move.
The official stated:
“It is true
to say that most armies around the world would have struggled in
the
circumstances
faced by 14 Div over the last two weeks. We should not
therefore
rush to
criticise what we were already aware was still some way from a
properly
1338
CIG
Assessment, 14 April 2008, ‘Iraqi Security Forces Performance in
MND(SE)’.
1339
eGram
26653/08 Basra to FCO, 8 July 2008, ‘Basra: Weekly
Update’.
1340
Minute PJHQ
[junior official] to PS/SofS [MOD], 2 April 2008, ‘Op TELIC:
Enhancing UK Operational
Support to
the Iraqi Army’.
394