The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
949.
The report
emphasised that funding issues would need to be resolved. Such
a
capability
would cost between £8m and £10m a year to maintain, with additional
and
more
substantial deployment costs.
950.
On the
multilateral response, the interim report recommended establishing
a
shared
international assessment of need, leading by example in seeking
agreed national
targets for
contributions, and seeking to improve international
structures.
951.
The Cabinet
Office produced a supplementary report on 5
September.605
The report
proposed four options:
•
the status
quo: about 270 civilian personnel deployed at an estimated
annual
cost of
£70m to £90m;
•
a UK
standby capacity able to deploy up to 350 better qualified
personnel,
costing
£98m to £140m per year;
•
an expanded
standby capacity able to deploy 550 personnel, costing
£122m
to £171m;
or
•
a Civilian
Reserve Corps of around 2,500 able to deploy 500 personnel at
any
one time,
at significant additional cost.
952.
The final
paper, reflecting discussions between Sir Gus O’Donnell,
Sir Andrew
Turnbull’s
successor as Cabinet Secretary, and the FCO, MOD and DFID
Permanent
Secretaries,
was produced for NSID(OD) on 21 January 2009.606
953.
The paper
stated that, although the UK’s performance was improving as
previous
reforms and
learning from operational experience took effect, the review had
identified
a number
of problems:
“Whitehall
structures to deliver civil effect are currently fragmented. MOD,
DFID,
FCO and the
Stabilisation Unit each deploy personnel to stabilisation and civil
effect
missions.
Problems include the lack of single-point accountability for
stabilisation
policy,
objectives, capability and delivery in Whitehall: multiple and
poorly
co-ordinated
mechanisms for resourcing civil effect; no effective unified
performance
management
of individuals; little effective measurement of the overall impact
of civil
effect; no
cross-Whitehall register of available skills; limited UK civil
effect planning
capability;
and a SU role that lacks clarity, focus and
authority.”
954.
The paper’s
recommendations included:
•
creation of
a Civilian Standby Capacity (CSC) from at least 1,000 civilians
and
a further
500 police, to provide a capability to deploy continuously at least
350
pre-trained
personnel;
605
Paper
Stabilisation Review Team, 5 September 2008, ‘Review of
Stabilisation and Deployed Civil Effect,
Capability
Options’.
606
Letter
Aldred to Gould, 16 January 2009, ‘Civil Effect’ enclosing Paper
Cabinet Office, [undated],
‘Stabilisation
and Deployed Civil Effect’.
518