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9.2  |  23 May 2003 to June 2004
an initial force level review that identified the possible requirement for additional
manpower. GOC MND(SE) has taken this work forward and produced a detailed
force level review of UK tasks across MND(SE).”
258.  Lt Gen Reith described a shift in the role of the military to one of support, in all lines
of operation other than security, which remained primarily a military responsibility. In the
UK’s area, he judged that there was no direct threat requiring a war-fighting capability,
but armoured forces continued to be useful for “protection, over-match, presence and
domination”. Other threats included paramilitary attacks, terrorism (including Improvised
Explosive Devices) and a breakdown of public order.
259.  Further calls on military resources were being generated by:
the reconstruction effort (in particular the need to protect key sites and facilities);
SSR activities;
the need to provide security for the Embassy compound in Baghdad and a
potential Consulate in Basra;
plans to open border crossings;
the need for river patrols to combat smuggling; and
the need to fill personnel gaps in the CPA structure.
260.  In addition, in the event of “localised resurgences in violence” Lt Gen Reith
anticipated that the UK might come under pressure to conduct cross-boundary operations.
261.  Lt Gen Reith wrote:
“The overall impact of these additional commitments is almost two companies of
manpower. This can just be met from within current resources, but has the penalty of
leaving absolutely no slack at all and no uncommitted reserve. The level of tasks is
also beginning to bite hard, now that R&R [Rest and Recuperation] has started, and
is assessed as being unsustainable.”
262.  As a result, Lt Gen Reith recommended deployment of:
an additional four-platoon131 infantry company as soon as possible;
identification of a reserve capability that would allow for rapid reinforcement, the
first part of which should be a four-platoon company already in Cyprus; and
some additional specialist capabilities, including Arabic speakers.
131  A platoon comprises between 26 and 55 people.
249
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