3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
386.
Sir David
advised Mr Blair that President Bush would want “to pick your
brains”. He
would “also
want to hear whether we can expect coalition support”. Sir David
wrote that
he had told
Dr Rice that if the US:
“… wanted
company, it would have to take account of the concerns of
potential
partners.
In particular:
•
the UN
dimension. The issue of the weapons inspectors must be
handled
in a way
that would persuade European and wider opinion that the US
was
conscious
of the international framework, and the insistence of many
countries
on the need
for a legal base. Renewed refusal by Saddam to accept
unfettered
inspections
would be a powerful argument;
•
the
paramount importance of tackling Israel/Palestine. Unless we did,
we could
find
ourselves bombing Iraq and losing the Gulf.”
387.
Sir David
concluded:
“No doubt
we need to keep a sense of perspective. But my talks with
Condi
convinced
me that Bush wants to hear your views on Iraq before taking
decisions.
He also
wants your support. He is still smarting from the comments from
other
European
leaders on his Iraq policy.
“This gives
you real influence: on the public relations strategy; on the UN
and
weapons
inspections; and on US planning for any military campaign. This
could be
critically
important. I think there is a real risk that the Administration
underestimates
the
difficulties. They may agree that failure is not an option, but
this does not mean
they will
avoid it.
“Will the
Sunni majority really respond to an uprising led by Kurds and
Shias? Will
the
Americans really put in enough ground troops to do the job …? Even
if they do,
will they
be willing to take the sort of casualties … if it turns out to be
an urban war,
and Iraqi
troops don’t … collapse … as Richard Perle and others confidently
predict?
They need
to answer these, and other tough questions, in a more convincing
way
than they
have so far before concluding that they can do the
business.
“The talks
at the ranch will also give you the chance to push Bush on the
Middle
East. The
Iraq factor means that there may never be a better opportunity to
get this
administration
to give sustained attention to reviving the MEPP.”
388.
Sir David
Manning told the Inquiry that he had gone to Washington on 12 March
for
a
“reconnaissance visit” in preparation for the meeting at Crawford,
and that the intention
was to
“take soundings”.138
The UK had
been clear by then that Iraq would be on the
agenda and
he had wanted to establish “where they [the US] had got to in
reviewing
Iraq policy”.
138
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 11-12.
455