9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
1035.
The Iraq
Directorate concluded “this is an intense agenda across a series
of
complex
inter-related problems, with security at their heart … The task is
considerable;
the stakes
are high; but it is imperative that we succeed.”
1036.
An FCO
briefing for Cabinet, circulated on 19 May, cautioned that
members
should not
“under-estimate the present difficulties”.581
There were
signs of better
organisation
by insurgents and a reservoir of popular support in both Sunni and
Shia
areas in
reaction to US military intervention in Fallujah and Najaf, with
the fighting
spreading
to MND(SE). These security difficulties were slowing reconstruction
and
affecting
Iraqi confidence in the Coalition.
1037.
The Chiefs of
Staff considered the US request for additional UK military
assets
to Iraq on
19 May.582
Although
they recognised there were risks and benefits in all
the
possible
options, they agreed that the “best military option” was the
deployment of both
HQ ARRC to
command both MND(CS) and MND(SE) and a Brigade to replace
US
forces in
the provinces of Najaf and Qadisiyah although Gen Walker stated
that “there
was current
doubt whether it could be delivered and sustained”.
1038.
On 20 May,
Mr Blair told Cabinet that he was hopeful of getting “the
right result”
from the
UN, although time was short and the Russians and French may cause
some
difficulties.583
A UN
blessing for the political process would give the new leaders
more
authority
to represent sovereign Iraq. But they also needed improved
security.
1039.
In their video
conference on 20 May, Mr Blair and President Bush discussed
the
timetable
for and sequence of events surrounding the transfer of
sovereignty.584
1040.
Mr Blair
proposed that the resolution should include clear language on
Iraqi
consent for
the continued presence of the MNF. He again emphasised the need to
press
on with
Iraqiisation of the security forces.
1041.
On 20 May, the
JIC issued an update on Iraq.585
1042.
The JIC judged
that “the current level of violence threatens to de-rail
Coalition
political
objectives in Iraq after 30 June”. It assessed that:
“The
immediate threat from Muqtada al-Sadr has been partly contained but
not
resolved.
Further flare-ups, on a potentially large scale, can be expected.
Al-Sadr
remains a
threat to Shia-Coalition relations: his death or capture could
provoke
serious
violence.”
581
Letter Owen
to Quarrey, 19 May 2004, ‘Iraq: The Medium Term’ attaching Paper
FCO, 19 May 2004,
‘Iraq: The
Medium Term’.
582
Minutes, 19
May 2004, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
583
Cabinet
Conclusions, 20 May 2004.
584
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 20 May 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with Bush, 20
May: Iraq’.
585
JIC
Assessment, 20 May 2004, ‘Iraq Update’.
377