The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the NATO
Secretary General, the Americans, Australians and other countries
with
forces
serving in Iraq.”131
215.
Gen Dannatt
explained in his memoir that the interview had been part of
a
concerted
effort to get the general public in the UK to understand “why we
were in
Afghanistan”.132
He
continued:
“Whatever
were the merits of our contribution to the intervention in Iraq, I
have
always been
firmly of the view that Afghanistan was much more important to
the
United
Kingdom … I saw my task as being to ensure that sufficient priority
was
placed on
achieving overall success in Iraq and Afghanistan …
“Of course,
Iraq was an extremely important issue in its own right, but as far
as
I was
concerned it sat within the overall strategic context of
Afghanistan, the huge
pressure on
our forces, and the wider security and moral issues that all this
posed.”
216.
Gen Dannatt
argued that the UK’s strategy for Iraq already was
withdrawal,
because
that was the essence of Gen Casey’s plan for transition. He
wrote:
“I
was reinforcing
Government
policy for a phased withdrawal from Iraq, not
criticising
it …
“I was,
after all, simply trying to generate support for the Army, as it
did what the
Government
was requiring of it, and at the same time to tell the nation of
the
importance
that I attached to eventual success in Afghanistan.”
217.
On 18 October,
Mr Browne wrote to Mrs Beckett to ask the FCO to set
out
(with DFID)
a view of the UK’s medium to long term foreign policy interests in
Iraq.133
He wrote
that it would be difficult to reach a view on force posture in the
absence
of that information.
218.
Mr Browne
wrote that he intended to visit Iraq again to “get my own sense of
what
is
achievable by the current Government”. Before the end of the year
there would need
to
be:
“… a UK/US
assessment on whether the current Iraqi Government realistically
can
hope to
deliver on security … It appears unlikely that the coalition will
be told to
leave but …
there may be pressure for a timetable as part of Maliki’s
negotiations
on reconciliation.”
“I am keen
to explore a scenario that has a more ambitious drawdown plan
linked
to
political developments and PM Maliki’s reconciliation initiatives …
[These] may
131
Powell
J. The New
Machiavelli: How to Wield Power in the Modern World. The
Bodley Head, 2010.
132
Dannatt
R. Leading
from the Front. Bantam
Press, 2010.
133
Letter
Browne to Beckett, 18 October 2006, ‘DOP(I) 20 Oct: Medium Term
Paper’.
44