6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
1113.
Maj Gen Wilson
told the Inquiry:
“General
Franks was very clear about the criticality of … Phase IV [and]
understood
the need to
have the resources available and the need for security and
the
relationship
between reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, disposable
funds
1114.
In Cabinet
on 16 January, Mr Blair listed priorities for the immediate
future:
•
“preparatory
work” on post-conflict planning and the role of the
UN;
•
the need to
communicate to the Iraqi people a vision of a better life;
and
•
contingency
work on the unexpected consequences of conflict.
1115.
The Cabinet
discussed Iraq on 16 January. The discussion is also addressed
in
Sections
3.6 and 6.2 .541
1116.
Ms Short said
that work on post-conflict issues needed to be taken
forward
urgently.
She emphasised the need for extra resources, the potential effect
of CBW on
civilians
and the importance of involving the UN.
1117.
Summarising
the discussion, Mr Blair said that the “priorities for the
immediate
future
were:
•
improved
communications, which would set out the Government’s strategy
and
be promoted
by the whole Cabinet;
•
preparatory
work on planning the aftermath of any military action and the role
of
the United
Nations in that, which should in turn be conveyed to the Iraqi
people
so that
they had a vision of a better life in prospect; and
•
contingency
work on the unintended consequences which could arise
from
the Iraqi
use of weapons of mass destruction, environmental catastrophe
or
internecine
strife within Iraq.”
1118.
Despite Mr
Blair’s promise that military options would be discussed and
the
imminence
of the formal decision to offer a significant land contribution,
Cabinet
was not
briefed on the substance of the military options or the
circumstances in
which force
would be used. It did not discuss the strategic implications of
making
a military
contribution.
1119.
On 17
January, Mr Blair approved the deployment of UK forces to
support
US military
preparation in the region.
1120.
He did so
without clear advice on the wider strategic implications
and
contingent
liabilities, including the potential UK responsibility for
post-conflict
administration
and reconstruction in the event of military action.
540
Public
hearing, 4 December 2009, pages 39-40.
541
Cabinet
Conclusions, 16 January 2003.
301