10.1  |  Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

on that point at Mr Blair’s meeting that morning. Ms Short asked her Private Office to

request that the Attorney General’s advice be committed to paper.

117.  Ms Short reported that “the Prime Minister had given her responsibility for

reconstruction in Iraq”. That role should be underpinned by a Cabinet Office Committee

chaired by Mr Chakrabarti. Ms Short added: “This area was our lead in Whitehall and

we needed to ensure that this was recognised.” Mr Chakrabarti said that he had already

spoken to Sir Andrew Turnbull, the Cabinet Secretary.

118.  Cabinet discussed Iraq on 27 March.84 Looking ahead, the Iraqi economy had

potential and the bureaucracy was competent. Iraq was not a failed state and should not

be a burden on the international community. Mr Hoon said that securing Iraq’s essential

economic infrastructure had been achieved through seizing the southern oilfields almost

intact. The sooner the oil could flow again, the sooner the profits could be used for the

Iraqi people.

119.  DFID produced its first substantive paper on post-conflict reconstruction at the end

of March.

120.  On 27 March, Mr Alistair Fernie, Head of DFID’s Middle East and North Africa

Department, sent a paper on reconstruction planning to Ms Short.85 Ms Short had seen

an earlier draft on 20 March.

121.  Mr Fernie advised that officials were:

“… now thinking how to take this [the paper] forward as part of a more

comprehensive DFID-led process across Whitehall, looking at the whole range of

international activities needed to help Iraq recover from conflict, sanctions and years

of misrule.”

122.  Mr Fernie advised that the paper had been revised to take account of Ms Short’s

comments on “getting the multilateral system working to support Iraqi institutions, the

importance of sustainable debt and reparations strategy, and focusing on using and

developing Iraqi talent rather than bringing in too many international consultants”.

123.  Comments had been received from the FCO, Treasury and Cabinet Office,

centring on:

• what the UK would do if there were no resolution authorising reconstruction;

Mr Fernie advised that, with the Attorney General’s advice now in writing,

“we should stick to our position that without an SCR the UK can only support

humanitarian relief and basic civil administration reform to ensure public

security”; and

84  Cabinet Conclusions, 27 March 2003.

85  Minute Fernie to Private Secretary/Secretary of State [DFID], 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Iraq Reconstruction

Planning’ attaching Paper DFID, 27 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Reconstruction Planning: Objectives and

Approach’.

23