The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
695.
On Iraq,
President Putin’s view was that the purpose of the military build
up was
to put
pressure on Iraq, not a preparation for war. Russia was doing the
same through
diplomatic
means and had managed to ensure that the Iraqis gave permission
for
scientists
to go abroad to be interviewed and searches of private homes.
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA
had some questions, but they were procedural, there were no
complaints that
Iraq was
interfering with the inspections. The inspectors should be allowed
to continue
their work.
He trusted the inspectors and they should be given more
time.
696.
Mr Blair
agreed that the inspectors should have time to do their job, but
it
was
“crucial” that it “did not become a game of hide and seek”. Iraq
had to help the
inspectors;
Saddam Hussein was obliged to give them positive co‑operation, not
just
access. He
would discuss the issues with President Bush and then speak to
President
Putin
again.
697.
President
Putin emphasised that it was a very important conversation
and
concluded
that Saddam Hussein should comply with all his obligations and
the
inspectors’
requests; he must accommodate our demands. Moscow was not
interested
in covering
for Iraq if it had weapons or was seeking to acquire them. If Iraq
had any
weapons,
they must destroy them and comply with the inspectors.
698.
Mr Campbell
wrote that the call was “encouraging”; President Putin was
“really
losing
patience with Saddam”.241
699.
In an
interview before the reports to the Security Council on 27 January,
Mr Igor
Ivanov, the
Russian Foreign Minister, told Al Jazeera that he strongly
doubted
that
the Council would authorise military action against Iraq: “the
chances … are
700.
Dr Blix
reported to the Security Council on 27 January that Iraq
appeared
to have
decided in principle to co‑operate on process, but an Iraqi
decision to
co‑operate
on substance would be “indispensible” for the inspectors to
complete
their
tasks.
701.
Iraq’s
declaration of 7 December did not provide new evidence which
would
eliminate
or reduce the unresolved issues identified in 1999.
241
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of
Power:
Countdown to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
242
Telegram 28
Moscow to FCO London, 28 January 2003, ‘Russia/Iraq: Russian
Response
to UNSC Reports’.
124