The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

50. On 4 July, Mr Blair told the House of Commons Liaison Committee that UK troops

would remain in Iraq:

“As long as the Government there wishes them to be there. I suspect over the next

18 months there will obviously be opportunities to draw down significant numbers of

British troops because the capacity of the Iraqi forces will build up.”42

51. When asked about Basra, Mr Blair agreed that some groups:

“… may use the presence of British forces as the excuse [for violence] but that

[driving British forces out] is not really their aim. Their aim is to get political and

security control of Basra so that they can run Basra rather than have the democratic

government run it.”43

52. On 6 July, DOP(I) discussed Mr Browne’s letter to Mr Blair and agreed his proposals

in principle.44

53. Mrs Margaret Beckett, who had been appointed as Foreign Secretary in May, and

Mr Hilary Benn, the International Development Secretary, said that their Iraq budgets

were fully committed, but were asked to look again at reprioritising their spending to fund

the Better Basra projects.

54. In a phone call with President Bush on 7 July Mr Blair said that the key issue for the

Iraqi Government was to work out how to deal with militias: the ISF did not know how

to do so.45 His view was that the Iraqi Government urgently needed to show they were

making a difference on security, in Basra as well as in Baghdad.

55. Maj Gen Cooper reported on 7 July that he had discussed an alternative approach

to transition to PIC in Maysan with Gen Casey and General Peter Chiarelli, Commander

Multi‑National Corps – Iraq (MNC‑I).46

56. Maj Gen Cooper considered that it was necessary to re‑posture UK forces in

Maysan, in light of the possibility of having to cover Dhi Qar province once Italian troops

had been withdrawn. Maj Gen Cooper believed that re‑posturing prior to PIC would, in

his view, allow UK forces to “deliver greater effect along the border” and would “send a

signal that we were serious about handing back responsibility for security”.

57. In his weekly report on 9 July, Lieutenant General Robert Fry, Senior British Military

Representative‑Iraq (SBMR‑I), described the difference in approach between the US

42 House of Commons Liaison Committee, Session 2005‑06, Minutes of Evidence 4 July 2006, HC 709‑iii,

Q419.

43 House of Commons Liaison Committee, Session 2005‑06, Minutes of Evidence 4 July 2006, HC 709‑iii,

Q421‑422.

44 Minutes, 6 July 2006, DOP(I) meeting.

45 Letter Banner to Hayes, 10 July 2006, ‘Prime Minister’s phone call with President Bush, 7 July:

Iraq, Afghanistan and MEPP’.

46 Minute Cooper, 7 July 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 7 July 2006’.

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