14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
175.
In September,
the DIS produced a review of the major threats from IEDs in
Iraq,
intended
“to provide analysis and outlook on current terrorist
activities”.84
The
review
emphasised
Iraq’s “long history of state sponsored manufacture of complex
IEDs,
as in the
case of the failed 1993 ‘Bush Bomb’”, and stated that the regime
had used an
“IED
strategy” as a means of extending domestic and foreign policy.
During the conflict
there had
been significant finds of radio‑controlled hardware
and:
“All
indications show that the Iraqi regime planned to continue to adapt
its well tested
pre‑conflict
IED strategy and production methods in a guerrilla conflict after
the
regime
capitulated …”
176.
The review
stated that RCIEDs accounted for around 50 percent of all
IED
incidents.
177.
On 25
September, the JIC reported that attacks against Coalition Forces
in the
South were
at the “lowest level since June” but it also judged that Shia
militias were
emerging in
the South.85
The tactics
of armed groups in Iraq continued to evolve,
“including
the increased use of more sophisticated IEDs and more elaborate
attacks”.
178.
A JIC
Assessment on 15 October stated that the South remained
“relatively
calm”,
although some former regime elements were aiming to “foment greater
unrest”.86
The JIC
noted that reporting that indicated “the return of a specific bomb
maker to
Basra” was
of “particular concern”.
179.
On 5 November,
the JIC reported that the situation in the South
remained
“relatively
calm” but there had been a spate of IED attacks in Basra province
in
mid‑October
including one using a sophisticated remote control
device.87
The JIC
also
stated that
IEDs were the “single most common form of attack” in Iraq, that
they were
“becoming
more sophisticated”, and that stand‑off attacks using remote
control were
“becoming
more common”.
180.
On 18
November, Mr David Williams, MOD Director Directorate
Capabilities,
Resources
and Scrutiny (DCRS), wrote to Mr John Dodds, Head of the
Defence,
Diplomacy
and Intelligence Team in the Treasury, seeking advice on how to
take forward
new force
protection measures within the agreed UOR “ceiling” of
£550m.88
Mr Williams
flagged a
new requirement for £73m to fund an electronic countermeasures
(ECM)
project,
Project L*.89
Mr Williams’
letter also sought funding for aerial surveillance,
which
is
addressed later in this Section with regards to ISTAR
provision.
84
Report DIS,
September 2003, ‘An Analysis of the Major IED Threats to Coalition
Forces in Iraq’.
85
JIC
Assessment, 25 September 2003, ‘Iraq Security’.
86
JIC
Assessment, 15 October 2003, ‘Iraq Security’.
87
JIC
Assessment, 5 November 2003, ‘Iraq Security’.
88
Letter
Williams to Dodds, 18 November 2003, ‘Additional Operation TELIC
UORs’.
89 A
cipher has replaced the name of this project for national security
reasons.
33