4.2 | Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002

294. Mr Campbell also wrote:

“Our public line is that the dossier will set out the facts which make HMG judge

Iraq/WMD to represent a real threat. It will be detailed and comprehensive.”

295. Mr Campbell set out the need to avoid leaks and comments to the media which

might “talk up the dossier”, adding:

“We should be making clear that even with the intelligence material, the picture can

never be a complete one because the inspectors have been out for so long.”

296. “[M]ost of the draft material” would be available later that day, “with the Agencies

providing the sections relevant to the middle part of our structure [Iraq’s chemical,

biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes], and the FCO providing the more

historical material”. Mr Scarlett would “want to go through the material before submitting

a consolidated draft to No.10 and others”.

297. Mr Campbell would “chair a team”, including officials from the FCO and No.10,

who would “go through the document from a presentational point of view and make

recommendations” to Mr Scarlett, who would decide whether they would be incorporated

in the dossier.

298. Once Mr Scarlett had reached a view on what would be “incorporated”, a

“judgement” would be needed on “whether a single person should be appointed

to write the final version”.

299. Mr Blair had “expressed an interest in seeing an advanced draft”. The timing

and arrangements for the launch of the document, including the involvement of Mr Blair

and other Ministers, were to be addressed once an advanced draft of the document

was available.

300. Mr Campbell concluded by referring to US intent to produce “a series of dossiers”

and wrote that he was “confident” that the UK dossier could complement rather than

conflict with them.

301. Mr Campbell’s minute was sent to Mr Straw and Mr Hoon as well as to the

intelligence Agencies, Sir David Omand, Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator,

and senior officials in the FCO and the MOD.

302. Mr Campbell wrote that he had had a meeting with Mr Scarlett on the dossier

before being “joined by three SIS people”, and they had “agreed a process for writing

the report”. He and Mr Scarlett had agreed that “the FCO was trying to take it over”,

and Mr Scarlett wanted ownership.146

303. Mr Campbell also wrote that he told Mr Straw that Mr Williams “should be part

of the team, not the writer”.

146 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

171