The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
489.
In a
subsequent conversation with representatives of EU Missions in New
York,
Sir Jeremy
had stated that it was “clear that Council members wanted a
steady,
intensifying
process which would give the inspectors time to provide either
positive
or negative
proofs”; and that “if the inspections proceeded normally, with
increasing
intensity,
there would be no need to rush to an early military judgement
(although the
US response
… was unpredictable)”. The timetable set out in resolution 1284
(1999)
was “still
obligatory”; and that the UK believed Iraq was concealing
evidence.168
490.
With
indications of concerns in Washington about becoming trapped in
the
UN and
tensions between the UN timetable and the military build‑up, the UK
focus
on the need
to find convincing evidence that Saddam Hussein was not
complying
with the
obligations set out in resolution 1441 and preceding
resolutions
intensified.
491.
Mr Blair
had a meeting with Sir Richard Dearlove on the afternoon of 9
January.169
There is no
No.10 record of the meeting.
492.
Sir Richard
Dearlove’s Private Secretary recorded Sir Richard’s view that
it had
been a good
meeting at which Mr Blair had emphasised the importance of
being able
to demonstrate
that the Iraqis were in material breach of resolution
1441.
493.
In response to
a question from Mr Blair about the likelihood of being able to
find
a “silver
bullet” that would demonstrate a material breach, Sir Richard
was reported to
have said
that “he felt the odds were 50/50”. That was “higher than the US
estimates but
he simply
could not guarantee a successful outcome”.
494.
Sir Richard
had also reported that Mr Blair’s parting words were:
“Richard, my fate
is in your
hands.”
495.
Mr Campbell
wrote in his diaries that:
•
C told
Mr Blair that Dr Blix “knew he was being ‘cat and moused’
but he was
not on
a mission. He was sure that Saddam was lying but he had to
establish
that for
himself. C felt that we had a better chance of finding the breaches
than
the
US.”
•
Mr Blair
had said, “half in jest”, “My future is in your
hands.”
•
“The
nightmare scenario, or one of them, was a discovery that was
sufficient
for the
US but not for us.”
168
Teleletter
[unnumbered] UKMIS New York to FCO London, 10 January 2003, ‘Iraq:
EU HOMS
Discussion’.
169
SIS record,
9 January 2003, ‘PM Meeting on Iraq’.
88