3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
inside the
US Administration. ‘The Bush team took TB’s comments as full
support,
and
pocketed them’, is Colin’s subsequent comment to
me.”178
580.
Lord
Turnbull told the Inquiry that the UK’s strategy on Iraq was set
following
the meeting
at Camp David.
581.
Lord Turnbull,
Cabinet Secretary from September 2002 to September 2005,
told
the
Inquiry:
“I arrived
at a very interesting transitional phase in this whole story … This
was,
I would
say, the conclusion of the strategy phase. The strategy was
basically set
following
Camp David. The idea that Saddam Hussein would be confronted,
that
there would
be an approach to the UN in alliance with the US and a
justification
would be
put into the public domain. All that happened within days of my
arrival …”179
582.
Lord Turnbull
added:
“I think
that was a point where a particular strategy coalesced, and at that
point
the
position of [the] Cabinet Office, the Civil Service generally was:
we now have a
settled
strategy and we now will pursue this and make it
effective.
“… there
was never any opportunity seriously to say, ‘This is the wrong
option.
Iran is the
real problem or Korea is the real problem’ or whatever … certainly
by
September
2002 that decision had been made …
“… We had
agreed, not only what we wanted to do but the Prime Minister …
had
agreed with
the President of the United States what was going to be done next,
and
the idea of
formulating [a] single resolution, and you could almost say setting
a trap
for Saddam
Hussein – the idea of an ultimatum, that was all formulated at
around
583.
Asked whether
the pros and cons of toppling Saddam Hussein had been
examined,
Lord Turnbull replied: “I think that was largely concluded by
September.”181
584.
Following
Mr Blair’s meeting of 23 July, there were no further
collective
recorded
discussions within the UK Government about the UK’s Iraq
strategy
before
Mr Blair’s meeting with President Bush at Camp David on 7
September.
585.
From the
end of July 2002 until Mr Blair’s meeting with President
Bush
at Camp
David, Mr Blair and Mr Straw were attempting to persuade
the US
Administration
to secure multilateral support before taking action on
Iraq.
178
Straw
J, Last Man
Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan,
2012.
179
Public
hearing, 13 January 2010, page 4.
180
Public
hearing, 13 January 2010, pages 21‑22.
181
Public
hearing, 13 January 2010, page 76.
193