The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
87.
However,
military advice was that leaving Iraq before the key tasks had
been
completed
would damage the morale and reputation of the UK Armed Forces.
ACM
Stirrup
strongly opposed the idea of the US taking over the training of 14
Division, which
would leave
the UK troops in a “low value-added supporting role of limited
benefit”.
The US
was thought likely to resent taking on “British tasks” when already
stretched.
88.
Consequently,
Mr McDonald recommended that Mr Brown should “decide that
UK
forces
complete training 14 Division, and then prepare to leave Basra”.
Completing the
training
“could make the difference to whether we can end our six-year
engagement in
Iraq as
success or failure”. Departure from Basra could begin before the
end of 2008,
making the
troop rotation that ended in May 2009 the last of Op TELIC. He
advised
that
Mr Brown should agree the policy with President Bush and then
with Presidential
Candidates
Mr Barack Obama and Mr John McCain, before being
announced in July.
Mr McDonald
also recommended that Mr Brown visit Iraq after the
announcement to
highlight
the UK’s economic and security achievements.
89.
On 15 June,
during a Presidential visit to London, Mr Brown hosted a
dinner for
President
Bush and the two men had an hour-long one-to-one the following
day.29
There
was no
discussion of troop numbers in Iraq. Mr Brown said that it was
right for the UK to
focus on
the four key tasks in MND(SE): training 14 Division, provincial
elections before
the end of
November, economic reconstruction, and preparation of the port and
airport
for
civilian control.
90.
On 16 June, Lt
Gen Cooper reported that Muqtada al-Sadr’s statement about
the
re-organisation
of JAM left both OMS and JAM “in limbo”.30
He reported
that some
commentators
wondered whether it was a precursor to disbanding JAM.
Muqtada
al‑Sadr had
repeated that OMS would not participate in the provincial elections
and
the movement
remained unregistered with the electoral authorities.
91.
Lt Gen Cooper
also reported that “stoppage in the SFA/SOFA negotiations is
now
well
trailed in the local and international media. We await details of
any new discussions
to
emerge.”
92.
On 20 June,
Maj Gen White-Spunner’s weekly report from Basra contained
“some
metrics
which show what life is like for Basrawis”, based on a survey
conducted for the
MNF-I by an
Iraqi team, which he judged to have “a good degree of independence
and
93.
The survey
showed that:
“Since the
start of Operation Charge of the Knights the responses of those
polled
(in May)
show a definite improvement in public perception with 90 percent
now
considering
they have enough to live on and 80 percent having enough
food
29
Letter
Fletcher to Gould, 17 June 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with US
President, 16 June’.
30
Minute
Cooper to CDS, 16 June 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (305) 16 Jun
08’.
31
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 20 June 2008, ‘MND(SE) Weekly Letter – 20
June 2008’.
396