9.1 | March to 22 May 2003

From July 2003, a senior UK military officer was deployed in Baghdad, in the dual role of

Deputy Commanding General within the Coalition military command and Senior British

Military Representative, Iraq (SBMR-I).154

This position, which existed until the eventual withdrawal of British troops from Iraq in

July 2009, was initially filled by Major General Freddie Viggers, who served from May to

September 2003.

Maj Gen Viggers reported to the Commander of CJTF-7, Lt Gen Sanchez; his reporting

lines back to the UK ran directly to Gen Walker and Gen Reith.155

CJTF-7 did not fall under Ambassador Bremer’s control. Lt Gen Viggers explained to the

Inquiry that the post was not based physically within the Corps headquarters but rather “it

was the military element of the Coalition Provisional Authority”.156 He told the Inquiry that:

“My focus was on the military aspects of the reconstruction Plan being delivered

by the CPA … My task was to provide the link between military HQ in the CPA

and the heads of various civil functions in the CPA. There was a separate Deputy

Commander for Operations in the CJTF-7 HQ … who was based in Corps HQ …

I provided military advice and information to the British Ambassadors … inside the

CPA … I worked closely with Ambassador Bremer’s Chief of Staff … and with the

key players involved in security functions, especially Walt Slocombe (responsible

for building the new Iraqi Army) and with Bernard Kerik (responsible for building the

Iraqi police).”157

Although the SBMR-I did not command the majority of UK troops within Iraq, he did have

command responsibility for the small number of UK military staff based in Baghdad.

275. On 1 May, Cabinet was told that British troops had done an excellent job in

restoring security in the South of Iraq.158 The problem was now one of criminality which

did not require British troops on the streets but rather police officers and a judicial

process. Persisting in patrolling with foreign troops “was not a good idea”.

276. Summing up the meeting, Mr Blair said that “little time had elapsed since the fall

of the Iraqi regime and much progress had been made”.

277. On 1 May, a brief sent by Mr Hoon’s Private Office to Mr Rycroft said:

“While ORHA has our broad support, it is not yet delivering in Iraq. It is too narrowly

controlled by the Pentagon, and continues to lack proper strategic direction, the

necessary grasp of cultural issues in Baghdad, and the requisite capabilities to make

a rapid difference on the ground. In being encouraging of ORHA, we are counselling

care against the Coalition appearing to appoint an Iraqi government.”159

154 Joint Commander’s Mission Directive to the UK Component Commanders, 21 August 2003,

‘Operation TELIC Phase 4’.

155 Statement Viggers, 8 December 2009, page 2.

156 Public hearing, 9 December 2009, pages 3-4.

157 Statement Viggers, 8 December 2009, pages 1-2.

158 Cabinet Conclusions, 1 May 2003.

159 Letter Watkins to Rycroft, 1 May 2003, ‘Meeting with the US Defense Secretary – 2 May 2003’.

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