3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
•
Nothing
should be done without the full authority and approval of the
UN.
•
Military
action should never be taken without clear and realistic
political
objectives
that were capable of achievement.
•
The most
immediate cause of instability in the Middle East was the
escalating
violence
between Israel and the Palestinians.
•
The need to
win the peace as well as war which meant considering a
post‑Saddam
Hussein Iraq before acting.
215.
Other speakers
were more supportive of military action, particularly if
diplomatic
routes had
been exhausted.
216.
Mr George
Howarth (Labour) asked if it “was possible to deal with rogue
states
under the
auspices of Security Council resolutions”, and whether Iraq was “a
serious
enough
threat to warrant the type of action that seems to be under
consideration”.73
If
the United
Nations was “to deserve and continue to enjoy a good level of
support”, it
was
“vitally important that Security Council resolutions are taken
seriously and amount
to more
than mere words on paper”. In his view there could be “no doubt”
that Saddam
Hussein was
“developing weapons of mass destruction of various kinds” and that
“our
security is
threatened by what might happen if no action is taken”. He had “no
difficulty”
supporting
the positions taken by Mr Blair and Mr Straw, including “if it
became obvious
that an
appropriate form of intervention was necessary”. In that event he
advocated
a debate in
which the case would be argued properly. There was “a case for
action,
but it must
be cautious, considered and carefully weighed”, and the House
should be
consulted
before action was taken.
217.
Mr Alan
Duncan, the Opposition spokesman on Defence, stated:
•
Iraq under
Saddam Hussein had “refused to acknowledge international
norms
or its own
international agreements”, oppressed its own people, and
appeared
“intent on
developing weapons of mass destruction” that the UK would
be
“naive” to
see as “merely defensive”.
•
The policy
of containment had been followed “with some success” but it
was
not enough
on its own “to defeat the evil of the Iraqi regime and its
weapons
programme”.
He questioned whether it was “any longer realistic to
pursue”
containment,
and whether the policy was “sufficient to guarantee the safety
and
security of
Iraq’s immediate neighbours and the wider world”.
•
In facing
the “latent threat” from Iraq, “we should not rule out any course
of
action”.
•
“Conservative
Members support the Prime Minister in his determination to
tackle
the issue
and not shy away from it, as some would wish. His full support
for
President
Bush shows an appreciation of the gravity of the issue and we
await
73
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 6 March
2002, column 74WH.
423