12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
It found
that the “post‑war instability of the Iraqi society appears to have
increased
reliance on
tribal justice even in the urban areas”. In some cases offences
were not
reported to
the police at all, but simply dealt with through the tribal justice
system.
One example
provided was alleged rape victims being placed in prison custody
“to protect
them from
honour‑related violence from their tribe”.
The annex
recommended that, in the longer term, the Iraqi Government should
engage
the public
in a general debate on tribal justice, including “its reasoning and
justification”.
A
comprehensive study of tribal justice was needed to understand its
impact on the
criminal
justice system. Efforts should also be made to raise awareness in
criminal justice
institutions.
Police training should include understanding which offences could
legally
be resolved
through the tribal system, and which must be referred to an
investigating
magistrate.
A dialogue should be commenced with tribal leaders to improve
compliance
with Iraqi
law.
“Immediately
post‑April 2003, the relationship between the IPS and the
political
parties and
their militia was largely opportunistic: it was based on the
affiliation and
sympathies
of individual members who were joining. (This is not the case in
other
parts of
the security forces.) However, more recently, political parties and
militia have
been
exploiting the lack of transparent recruitment, vetting and central
oversight to
deliberately
place their supporters within the IPS.
“It is
assessed that the majority of IPS officers are associated with a
political party
and/or
tribe with whom their allegiance is stronger than their allegiance
to the IPS.
The extent
to these ties and the degree to which they undermine the efficiency
of
the police
to support the Rule of Law is significant. It is now likely that if
called upon
to take
action against them, the IPS would support their party’s militia or
tribe. The
larger
parties have well‑armed and well‑organised militias, but the
paramilitary
capabilities
of the tribes vary.
“Often,
political party and tribal allegiances of one or both heavily
influence the
dynamics of
the relations between the Chiefs of Police and Provincial
Governors.
The
potential of the parties to use the IPS to effect political, social
and religious
influence
is a serious concern. By using affiliated IPS officers to carry
out
‘de‑Ba’athification’,
the political parties are able to create vacancies in
influential
positions
within the IPS for their own members. There are also signs that
Islamic
fundamentalism
is increasing within IPS ranks.
“It is
clear that the judiciary in the South is subject to interference
either direct or
indirect
from tribes, political parties, militia and IPS intimidation.
Subsequently, they
are not the
Rule of Law bulwark that they should be or that they need to be in
order
to address
tribal, religious or political party influence.”
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