The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

64. In his evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee on 21 January,

Mr Blair emphasised the importance of the post-conflict phase:

“You do not engage in military conflict that may produce regime change

unless you are prepared to follow through and work in the aftermath of that

regime change to ensure the country is stable and the people are properly

looked after.”

65. In his evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee on 21 January,

Mr Blair stated:

“It is a terrible responsibility ever to commit troops to action, but I believe we were

right to do it in both Kosovo and Afghanistan. When I say is it right and is it do-able,

is it do-able militarily but also is the aftermath something that you can handle as well,

because I think that is important too.”37

66. Asked about the risks of military action for stability in Iraq and the region, Mr Blair

stated:

“That is precisely why part of any preparations is to make clear, firstly that the

territorial integrity of Iraq is sacrosanct … and … why we must make sure that we

try and do everything we can to follow through. That is why I say military conflict, if

it comes to that, is not the end of the issue; there are humanitarian questions, there

are questions of what type of government, and all these things have got to be looked

at very carefully. We are obviously in detailed discussion with people about them.”38

67. Asked about the role of opposition groups in a reconstructed Iraq, Mr Blair said:

“I think it is important that we try to make sure that any potential successor

government has the requisite stability but, also, has as broad a representation as

possible … One of the things I am wary about at this point in time is saying ‘Look,

this is exactly what we believe should happen’ in circumstances where we have not

actually got to the point of saying we should have a conflict.”39

68. Sir George Young (Conservative) asked Mr Blair:

“Is it not the case that actually the more difficult stage is stage two [nation-building],

and that is the stage at which we might get more involved. To what extent are you

confident that the whole strategy will not be undermined because stage two does not

follow through the success of stage one [military action]?”40

37 Liaison Committee, Session 2002-2003, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Liaison Committee

Tuesday 21 January 2003, Q 67.

38 Liaison Committee, Session 2002-2003, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Liaison Committee

Tuesday 21 January 2003, Q 110.

39 Liaison Committee, Session 2002-2003, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Liaison Committee

Tuesday 21 January 2003, Q 112.

40 Liaison Committee, Session 2002-2003, Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Liaison Committee

Tuesday 21 January 2003, Q 117.

322