The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

586. In response to a request from Sir David Manning for advice on interviews by

UN inspectors in Iraq, Mr Scarlett provided a brief co‑ordinated with the FCO, SIS, DIS

and OD Sec.198

587. Mr Scarlett wrote that Iraq had deployed many subterfuges to interfere with the

interview process conducted by UNSCOM in the 1990s. Despite those efforts, UNSCOM

had “found interviews an extremely important tool, particularly on the biological warfare

programme, where the availability of other types of information was limited”.

588. Mr Scarlett described measures currently being taken by Iraq to ensure that

interviews did not “succeed in uncovering prohibited activity”. The UK had provided a

database with about 6,000 names although information on individuals involved in WMD

activities post 1991 was limited. The UK was in the process of providing a shortlist

of “priority” candidates for interview, and had offered advice on interview techniques.

So far, only the IAEA had conducted two formal interviews; both had taken place in Iraq

and the individuals had asked for Iraqi officials to be present.

589. Mr Scarlett concluded that interviews had the “potential, if conducted effectively,

to uncover gaps in Iraq’s cover story”. Iraq was “worried about this prospect”. The UK

was concerned that UNMOVIC and the IAEA lacked “the expertise necessary to use

this important tool effectively”. Mr Blair should press Dr Blix on the continuing need

for effective interviews.

590. In their meeting on 17 January, Mr Blair urged Dr Blix to “give Baghdad a strong

message that this was their final chance and that the US were serious about military

action”.199 Mr Blair also underlined “the importance of the inspectors carrying out

interviews without minders” and offered UK help in identifying potential interviewees.

591. Following further discussion of recent developments including the finds of shells

and documents the previous day, Mr Blair stated that “if Iraq was co‑operating then the

inspectors would need time to continue their work. But if Iraq was not co‑operating it

would be better to make that clear soon after 27 January, before the end of February.”

592. Dr Blix said:

“[A]lthough the Iraqis gave prompt access, they did not seem sincere. They

did things for the media, eg a 12,000 page declaration that contained no new

substance … The Prime Minister concluded that if there were a major find Blix would

report it immediately, and if there were not a major find before 27 January Blix would

report then that his overall assessment was a lack of substantive co‑operation.

Blix agreed. He thought the Iraqis would prefer to deny access to the inspectors than

to be caught red‑handed; he would of course report either to the Security Council.”

198 Minute Scarlett to Manning, 16 January 2003, ‘Inspections in Iraq – The Use of Interviews’.

199 Letter Rycroft to Sinclair, 17 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting with Blix, 17 January’.

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