The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
953.
For
battlefield helicopters, Mr Woolley wrote that “planned
activity levels over the
next two
years remain at or above the maximum concurrency assumed in
provisional
DPAs”.
Commitments were only being met by compromising the Harmony
Guidelines503
and using
crews and key support staff at tour intervals of “1on/2off or less”
instead of
“1on/4
off”.
954.
Mr Woolley
concluded:
“Increasing
significantly the size of rotorcraft fleet and training more crews
are
not
realistic options, nor in the short term is reducing the level of
operational
commitment.
The only viable strategy is to accept a reduced harmony ratio
of
1on/2 off
over the next two years, requiring careful management of key
personnel.
The Puma
and Chinook fleets are currently under the greatest
pressure.”
955.
The £3.2bn
across 10 years for investment in the FRC programme had also
been
affected,
with £60m from the first eight years having been re‑profiled.
Mr Woolley wrote
that
“considerable effort” had gone into identifying the consequences of
that decision
for
existing helicopter fleets and “the most significant risk” would be
sustaining Puma
and Lynx
through to the introduction of their replacements. Additional
funding had been
allocated
to Lynx to extend its time in service until its replacement was
available, albeit
at a
reduced fleet size of 66 (from 82).
956.
The DMB agreed
that a measure to reduce Joint Helicopter Command
(JHC)
activity
levels should be offset by measures to restore Chinook and Puma
funding
because “it
was felt that these additional costs were an acceptable financial
risk, given
the
significant operational benefits”.504
957.
A proposed
reduction in Gazelle activity was rejected, with compensating
savings
to be found
elsewhere in the land budget. The activity reductions for other
helicopters
“although
unwelcome, were acceptable”.
958.
The MOD told
the Inquiry that it withdrew its Chinook helicopters from Iraq in
2005
in order to
prepare for operations in Afghanistan and replaced them with the
Merlin
helicopters.505
The MOD
stated that was because Chinook helicopters were better
suited
to the
challenging conditions found in Afghanistan.
959.
In a statement
to the Inquiry, ACM Torpy explained:
“… as
confidence in Merlin grew it was possible to withdraw Chinook from
Iraq to
allow the
force to recuperate from a prolonged period on operations. It also
gave
the force
the opportunity to prepare for operations in Afghanistan, where the
hot
503
Harmony
Guidelines described the maximum time that Service Personnel should
spend away from
their
families (known as Individual Separated Service) and the minimum
time that they should have
between
operational deployments (known as tour intervals). Harmony
Guidelines are addressed in detail
in
Section 16.1.
504
Minutes, 26
January 2005, Defence Management Board meeting.
505
Paper
[MOD], 1 March 2011, ‘Request for Evidence, Support
Helicopters’.
162