10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
technical
assistance for the economic and institutional reforms which will
underpin
the
reconstruction process, and help the Iraqi Government to stimulate
the private
sector
growth, foreign investment and international lending which will
enable them to
address
poverty.”
131.
In pursuing
those objectives, DFID would:
•
Work though
multilateral channels. DFID’s “overriding aim” should be to
ensure
that Iraq
received comprehensive and prompt support from
international
institutions
and the wider international community. DFID would
“wherever
possible …
seek to channel the bulk of our financial contributions
through
multilateral
arrangements … and complement this with targeted
technical
assistance
in areas where DFID has expertise”.
•
Tackle
dependence on humanitarian assistance. Emergency relief
and
rehabilitation
should blend with immediate reconstruction priorities.
•
Plan for a
short-term engagement: “given its potential wealth, we
should
aimfor Iraq
to be self-sufficient as quickly as possible, perhaps within
three
years,
though some continuing technical assistance may prove
appropriate
beyond
that”.
132.
The paper
stated that experience in Afghanistan had shown that the
international
community
was slow to create tangible benefits on the ground which might
demonstrate
the
“dividends of peace” to communities during “politically and
culturally unstable
post‑conflict
times”. DFID had “a justified reputation for relatively speedy
response”,
and would
consider whether its existing humanitarian programme in Iraq and
the
additional
emergency work it might fund after the conflict might provide a
useful base to
support
wider reform in the water/sanitation and health sectors, to ensure
that tangible
benefits
were provided to the Iraqi people relatively quickly.
133.
The UK would
find itself in a “critically responsible role” in Iraq, having
been
involved
from the start in the military campaign. As the main ally of the
US, the UK
would be
in a unique position to influence its engagement.
134.
The paper
concluded:
“Iraq is
different to many developing countries which face shortages of
well-educated
and
technically competent people. Using Iraq’s existing talent pool
(including, with
some
political caution, returning exiles) as far as possible, and
ensuring its relatively
young
population is educated to replace that pool, will be an essential
investment
and reduce
political tension.”
135.
Eight days
after the start of the invasion, officials recommended the creation
of a
Cabinet
Committee to oversee the UK approach to
reconstruction.
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